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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This working document is released in parallel  with the Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of 
macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2004 and is meant to complement it. 
It discusses the economic situation in the  countries for which either new macro-
financial assistance operations have been decided by the Council or disbursements 
under previously decided operations have been made or are still outstanding in 2004.  
In line with the recommendations of the Court of Auditors in their special report of 
March  2002,  particular  attention  is  paid  to  the  relevant  aspects  of  the  transition 
process and of the implementation of structural reforms in the beneficiary countries. 
Progress in this respect also reflects the degree to which the corresponding economic 
policy conditions attached to the EC macro-financial assistance have been met.  
This  report  is  submitted  in  accordance  with  the  Council  Decisions  regarding 
Community macro-financial or exceptional financial assistance to third countries and 
follows on from the reports presented in previous years
1. 
The complete list of macro-financial assistance operations decided by the Council 
with the corresponding disbursements up to the end of 2004 appears in Annex, as 
well as well as statistical data of the related countries.  
                                                 
1  See the following Communications from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
with the title 'Report on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries: 
COM(1992)400 of 16 September 1992. 
COM(1994)229 of 7 June 1994. 
COM(1995)572 of 27 November 1995. 
COM(1996)695 of 8 January 1997. 
COM(1998)3 of 13 January 1998. 
COM(1999)580 of 15 November 1999. 
COM(2000)682 of 27 October 2000. 
COM(2001)288 of 1 June 2001. 
COM(2002)352 of 11 July 2002. 
COM(2003)444 of 24 July 2003. 
COM(2004)523 of 28 July 2004.  
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2.  ALBANIA 
2.1.  Executive summary 
GDP growth accelerated to an estimated 6.2 % in 2004. The continuing appreciation 
of  the  lek  together  with  modest  inflationary  pressure  have  provided  scope  for 
additional monetary policy easing in 2004. Large imbalances remain in the external 
sector. While the trade deficit is estimated to have remained above 20% of GDP for 
2004, substantial private transfers from abroad have contributed to finance a current 
account deficit of an expected 7.5% of GDP. Foreign direct investment has been 
boosted in 2004 by the privatisation of the Savings Bank in spring. Progress has been 
achieved in financial sector restructuring and privatisation, but the privatisation of 
remaining large state-owned enterprises has been relatively slow, in particular with 
regard to telecommunication and energy utilities. Some progress was achieved in the 
management  of  public  expenditures  and  revenues.  In  April  2004,  the  Council 
adopted a decision to provide macro-financial assistance to Albania for a maximum 
amount of EUR 25 million. The implementation of this assistance is expected to take 
place in 2005.  
2.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth accelerated to about 6.2 % in 2004. This was the combined result of a 
significant  increase  in  domestic  hydro  power  production,  improved  agricultural 
output  and  a  steady  upward  trend  of  growth  in  services.  Inflation  developments 
remained subdued in 2004, helped by a good harvest and the continued appreciation 
of the lek. 12-month consumer price inflation stood at 2.2% in December 2004. 
In 2004, fiscal consolidation continued. The government deficit is estimated to have 
reached 5.2% of GDP and is planned at 4.8% of GDP in 2005. During the first 9 
months of 2004, the overall fiscal deficit registered a decline of 2.4% on a year-on-
year  basis.  Since  revenues  had  been  below  the  government’s  target  in  2003,  the 
authorities implemented adjustment measures in the form of a lower revenue target 
for the 2004 budget, equivalent of 0.7% of GDP, to offset the shortfall. For 2004, tax 
revenues  are  estimated  to  have  increased  to  20.2%  of  GDP.  However,  continued 
efforts in this area are necessary as tax revenues still remain among the lowest in the 
region (as a percentage of GDP). Government expenditure declined to 26.5% of GDP 
in 2003 and remained 2 percentage points below target as contingency measures to 
offset the revenue shortfall were taken (mainly savings on subsidies for imported 
electricity facilitated by favourable conditions for hydropower which contributed to 
improved  domestic  supply,  as  well  as  delayed  or  smaller  salary  increases  for 
personnel). For 2004, expenditures are estimated by the authorities to have reached 
28.8%. Some tax measures, especially beneficial for businesses have been taken, 
inter alia: the reduction of the simplified small businesses profit tax and the corporate 
tax  rates  (from  4%  to  3%  and  from  25%  to  23%,  respectively).  Moreover,  the 
introduction of a personal annual income declaration system is scheduled for 2006. 
The  absence  of  substantial  inflationary  pressure  and  the  continuing  nominal 
appreciation of the lek opened the scope for a relaxation of monetary policy. As a 
result, the Bank of Albania lowered its main policy rate by 100 basis points to 5.25% 
in 2004.  
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The current account deficit is expected to have marginally declined to 7.5% of GDP 
in 2004. as a smaller trade deficit was partly offset by a decline in private transfers. 
A substantial increase in foreign direct investment to EUR 309 million (about 6% of 
GDP) was expected for 2004 against EUR 158 million (about 3% of GDP) in 2003, 
partly as a result of the international sale of the Savings Bank for an amount of EUR 
103 million. 
2.3.  Structural reforms 
Progress in public administration reform has continued, but the strengthening of the 
tax administration remains a major challenge. In the field of financial control and 
audit, some significant progress has been made recently. Whereas privatisation of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises has been completed, large-scale privatisation 
has  suffered  delays  over  recent  years.  However,  as  far  as  the  banking  sector  is 
concerned, the sale of Savings Bank, the largest bank of the country, to a strategic 
foreign investor was completed in 2004. As a result of this sale the banking sector is 
now almost completely in private hands. 
Some progress was made in the area of public finance control, notably as a result of 
the entering into force of the Law on Internal Audit in April 2004. Nonetheless, an 
overall  Public  Internal  Financial  Control  strategy,  strengthened  financial  control 
structures and a better implementation of existing financial control-related legislation 
remain necessary. In addition, further measures to curb down the size of the informal 
sector would help to support fiscal consolidation.  
A  strengthening  of  the  tax  administration  remains  also  at  the  core  of  the  fiscal 
strategy,  as  well  as  the  fight  against  tax  evasion,  fraud  and  corruption,  and  the 
improvement  of  the  VAT  system.  The  improvement  of  communication  with  tax 
payers,  the  simplification  of  tax-payment  procedures  and  the  development  of  a 
functioning  system  which  guarantees  the  re-payment  of  taxes  collected  in  excess 
would also contribute to increase tax collection and enhance confidence between tax 
payers and the tax administration, in particular in an country where over the 95% of 
the economy is composed of small- and medium-sized enterprises. On a positive 
note, in 2004 98.5% of the revenue target was achieved and 2,700 new taxpayers 
were recorded. 
2.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In April 2004, the Council decided to provide macro-financial assistance to Albania 
for a maximum amount of EUR 25 million, including EUR 16 million of grants and 
EUR 9 million of loans, to help support its external financing requirements. The 
release of this assistance was postponed to 2005, given the more favourable than 
anticipated  balance-of-payments  developments  in  2004,  provided  it  remains 
necessary  to  finance  external  account  needs.  Negotiations  on  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding,  which  defines  the  conditionality  applying  to  this  assistance,  were 
successfully concluded in October 2004. The focus of this conditionality is on the 
areas  of  public  finance  management,  public  administration  and  financial  sector 
reform,  as  well  as  on  improving  the  business  environment  and  private  sector 
development.   
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In March 2004, an operational assessment of the reliability of financial circuits and 
procedures at the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Albania was carried out by an 
external  consultant,  on  behalf  of  DG  ECFIN.  This  assessment  concluded  that  a 
framework for sound financial management at both authorities is effective. However, 
to further strengthen this framework, conclusions of the operational assessment are 
reflected in the conditionality of the agreed Memorandum of Understanding.  
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM  
1.  Price liberalisation 
Most price categories are liberalised except for some public services and utilities. Prices of electricity and oil 
have been increased towards cost recovery levels under the oversight of the Regulatory Authority. Electricity 
prices for poor families are however still subsidised. Pricing for telecommunication is fully liberalised, even for 
international calls. Railway transport prices remain subsidized. 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Albania  is  a  WTO  member  since  2000  and  has  concluded  Free  Trade  Agreements  negotiations  with  its 
neighbouring countries and is implementing them. Negotiations with Turkey and Moldova on such agreements 
continued in 2004. 
3.  Exchange regime 
Albania maintains a managed floating exchange rate regime. However, the Bank of Albania intervenes when 
necessary to smooth out strong fluctuations. In 2004, the lek appreciated by about 5.5% and 7.1% against the 
euro and the US dollar, respectively. 
4.  Foreign Direct Investment 
For 2004, a substantial increase in foreign direct investment to EUR 309 million (about 6% of GDP) against 
EUR 158 million (about 3% of GDP) in 2003 was expected, partly as a result of the international sale of the 
Savings Bank. However, the number of administrative barriers to establish a business in Albania remains high.  
5.  Monetary policy 
The Bank of Albania continued with its stability-oriented monetary policy in 2004 and maintained its 2-4% 
inflation target. Credit growth remained robust and at end-August 2004 credit to the economy constituted 12.6% 
of M3 and 7.3% of GDP (up from 6.8% of GDP in 2003). The base interest rate is at a historical minimum of 
5.25%, after having been cut by 100 basis points during 2004. 
6.  Public Finance 
The  performance  in  terms  of  revenue  collection  has  been  improved  compared  to  previous  years,  but  still 
remained below needs given the country’s weak tax revenue base. In 2004, 98.5% of the revenue target was 
achieved and 2,700 new taxpayers were recorded. 
7.  Privatisation and Enterprise Restructuring 
Privatisation in Albania gained some momentum with the successful sale of the Savings Bank to Raiffeisen Bank 
in early 2004. The privatisation of  Albtelekom and  ARMO (fuel company) is underway and completion  is 
expected by  year-end 2005. A  feasibility study on the privatization of KESH (electricity state company) is 
foreseen  in  2005.  However,  progress  in  the  process  of  restructuring  and  privatization  of  large  insolvent 
companies has been slow.  
8.  Financial Sector Reform 
The  successful  privatisation  of  the  Savings  Bank,  together  with  steps  taken  to  privatise  the  main  Albanian 
insurance company, INSIG, represents considerable progress towards the completion of the privatisation of the 
financial sector. The banking sector is virtually to 100% in private hands. Confidence in the banking sector has 
increased  with  local  and  foreign  deposits  growing  in  the  12-months  to  July  2004  by  9.7%  and  13.6%, 
respectively.   
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3.  ARMENIA 
3.1.  Executive summary 
The Armenian economy continued to grow fast in 2004 so that the pre-transition 
level of GDP will be recovered in 2005. Real GDP growth reached 10.1% while the 
sectoral composition of economic growth reversed from the previous  year with a 
strong  pick  up  in  agricultural  production  (+14.5%)  combined  with  a  much  more 
modest growth rate in industrial production (+2.1%). The Central Bank of Armenia 
refrained  from  intervening  in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  and  as  a  result  the 
appreciation of the Armenian dram contributed to a marked decrease in consumer 
price inflation (2% at end-2004 down from 8.6% at end-2003).  
There has also been gradual progress in structural reforms, but the overall business 
environment  is  not  yet  conducive  to  more  broadly  based  economic  growth.  The 
government continues to focus on stabilisation of energy supplies, and several new 
investment projects are in progress. 
Armenia implemented satisfactorily the economic programme supported by the IMF. 
The final review under the PRGF-supported three-year arrangement was concluded 
in December 2004 and consequently, the total approved amount of the arrangement 
has been disbursed to the country. The EC disbursed a grant instalment of EUR 5.5 
million to Armenia in July 2004 after the country made a principal repayment of 
EUR 7 million to the Community. Armenia’s outstanding debt to the EC was thereby 
reduced to only EUR 2 million.  
3.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
As expected, real GDP growth was slightly slower in 2004 at about 10% after two 
years of very strong economic performance (average growth of 13.5% in 2002/2003). 
Agriculture,  services  and  construction  were  driving  the  economy  while industrial 
production posted only  modest growth at two% largely due to disruptions in the 
supply of uncut stones for the diamond polishing sector. Processing of diamonds 
accounted for about 40% of exports in 2004 (about 50% in 2003). New investments 
in metallurgy, minerals and machine building are likely to contribute to a gradual 
diversification of exports in coming years. Despite the strong growth performance, 
officially registered unemployment has declined relatively little (from 10.8% in 2002 
to 9.4% in 2004) while the level of unemployment indicated by household surveys is 
even higher at well over 20%. 
The overall fiscal balance is on a sound basis with an estimated deficit of about 1.5% 
of GDP. A deficit of 2.6% was originally projected in the 2004 budget but because of 
some delays in the implementation of planned capital spending, total expenditures 
were below the budgeted level. The tax revenues-to-GDP ratio is estimated at 14.4% 
(14% in 2003). Nevertheless, at around 16%, total revenues as a percentage of GDP 
are  below  their  level  in  2003  because  of  a  reduction  in  external  grants.  The 
introduction of a minimum turnover tax (at a rate of 1%) boosted tax collection from 
the corporate sector which had previously avoided paying profit tax by reporting 
losses. On the other hand, VAT and excise collection lagged behind overall output 
growth.  The  nominal  increase  in  current  expenditure  (+20%)  was  directed  in 
particular to finance a rise in public sector wages, higher defence expenditure and  
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higher social spending in line with priorities set in the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper. Interest payment fell as a result of more concessional composition of public 
debt. 
The  12-month  inflation  decelerated  from  a  peak  of  9.5%  (July  2004)  to  2.0% 
(December 2004). By allowing the dram to appreciate, the Central Bank of Armenia 
curbed inflationary expectations towards its target inflation rate of three%. Despite 
the  real  effective  appreciation  of  the  dram,  the  loss  of  competitiveness  is  still 
considered to be relatively minor given a real depreciation of around 25% in 2000-
2003.  
The recent appreciation of the dram is driven by a strong rise in workers’ remittances 
and other private transfers. According to preliminary estimates, the current account 
deficit narrowed down to below 5% of GDP in 2004 (6.8% in 2003).  The trade 
deficit widened to about 18% of GDP as imports growth (+5.6%) exceeded exports 
growth (+4.3%). Foreign direct investment accelerated from the previous year (food 
industry, communications, construction and transport being the prominent sectors). 
The gross international reserves of the Central Bank of Armenia are comfortably 
high covering nearly four months of imports. In nominal terms the public external 
debt is at about USD 1.1 billion, while as a ratio to GDP it is estimated at about 33% 
(down from about 39% in 2003).  
Armenia implemented satisfactorily the economic programme supported by the IMF. 
The IMF Executive Board concluded in December 2004 the final review under the 
PRGF-supported  three-year  arrangement.  The  total  available  amount  of 
disbursements under the PRGF-arrangement (SDR 69 million) had been disbursed 
when  the  arrangement  expired  at  the  end  of  2004.  Discussions  on  a  possible 
successor arrangement are likely to start in early 2005. The World Bank approved in 
June  2004  a  new  Country  Assistance  Strategy  for  Armenia,  which  foresees  IDA 
lending of USD 170 million over four years. The total amount could be increased up 
to USD 220 million if the improvements in public finance management accelerate in 
Armenia. The World Bank focuses on reducing non-income aspects of poverty (such 
as access to basic services) and making economic growth overall more beneficial to 
the poor. 
3.3.  Structural reform 
There has also been gradual progress in structural reforms, but the overall business 
environment  is  not  yet  conducive  to  more  broadly  based  economic  growth.  The 
business climate remains difficult for new small and medium sized enterprises in 
particular.  The  highly  concentrated  firm  structure  in  the  formal  economy  is 
dominated by vested interests. Some steps were taken in the implementation and 
monitoring  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  (adopted  at  the  end  of 2003)  but  the 
government’s commitment was perceived fairly weak. 
Due to persistent weaknesses in tax and customs administration, the gap between 
actual and potential revenue collection remains large. The situation is unlikely to 
improve substantially until the administrative structures are consolidated under the 
remit of the Ministry of Finance and Economy. In 2004, a two-year programme was 
drafted to reform some problematic areas of the administration, including addressing 
outstanding tax arrears from companies and meeting VAT refund commitments in a  
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timely manner. A number of VAT exemptions on imported goods were removed in 
2004. The tax base was expanded to include large retail markets. Consistent with its 
WTO commitments, Armenia is expected to increase the use of declared transaction 
values  for  assessing  customs  duties  and  VAT.  In  more  general  terms,a  major 
challenge, which cannot be delayed very long, is to consolidate a large number of 
often contradictory provisions in the tax legislation into a unified tax code.  
The  Central  Bank  of  Armenia  (CBA)  continued  to  strengthen  regulations  in  the 
banking  sector.  New  anti-money  laundering  legislation  was  approved  by  the 
parliament in November 2004 and a Financial Intelligence Unit will be created at the 
Central Bank for its implementation. The CBA intervened in eight banks over the 
past  few  years,  and  the  last  one  of  these  (Armcommunications  Bank)  avoided 
liquidation when it was recapitalised by new investors which also acquired its largest 
debtor, the Nairit chemical plant. Some of the 19 operating banks would still have 
difficulties  in  meeting  the  new  minimum  capital  requirement  of  USD  5  million 
which becomes effective in mid-2005. The CBA is expected to pay more attention to 
corporate  governance  issues  in  the  banks  and  in  the  non-bank  financial  sector. 
Transparency  and  efficiency  need  to  be  addressed  seriously  also  in  the  judicial 
system  to  encourage  deepening  of  the  financial  intermediation  and  new  business 
development. Total bank assets are at a low level equivalent to about 19% of GDP. 
The  dispute  involving  the  government  and  Armentel,  the  monopoly  operator  in 
telecommunications since the privatisation in 1997, was settled between the parties 
outside the court. The government subsequently issued a second licence to another 
operator. In mobile phone and internet services Armenia has lagged behind other 
countries in the region. 
Despite having a liberal trade regime, Armenia has not been able to fully benefit 
from increased trade opportunities after it became a WTO member in February 2003 
because  of  its  isolated  position,  high  transportation  costs  and  shortcomings  in 
customs procedures. In 2004 a temporary closure by Russia of a border crossing with 
Georgia affected also Armenia’s trade routes. In an attempt to diversify both exports 
and  imports,  Armenia  has  strengthened  trade  relations  with  Iran.  The  two 
governments  decided  in  2004  to  construct  a  gas  pipeline  from  Iran  to  Armenia. 
Armenia envisages exporting electricity to Iran. 
The government continues to focus strongly on stabilisation of energy supplies, and 
several new investment projects are in progress in addition to the gas pipeline, such 
as the development of small and medium-sized hydropower plants. A liquidation 
process  of  Armenergo,  a  wholesale  intermediary  between  energy  generation  and 
distribution, was initiated in November 2004. The subsequent direct contracting is 
expected  to  improve  market  mechanisms  in  the  energy  sector  (regulated  by  the 
Public  Services  Regulatory  Commission).  Tariff  collection  for  consumed  energy 
reached nearly 100% in 2004. 
3.4.  Implementation of exceptional financial assistance 
Armenia has benefited from EC’s exceptional financial assistance which consists of a 
loan of EUR 28 million (disbursed in December 1998) and a total grant amount of up 
to EUR 30 million. Altogether five grant instalments, in the total amount of EUR 
28.5 million, were paid under the assistance during the period 1998-2004. Through  
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early principal repayments, Armenia has reduced the outstanding amount of its debt 
to the Community to EUR 2 million. The fifth grant instalment of EUR 5.5 million 
was paid in July 2004 after Armenia had made an early principal repayment of EUR 
7  million  to  the  EC  as  had  been  agreed  with  the  Armenian  authorities  in  the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 
In  April  2004,  before  proceeding  with  the  above  mentioned  disbursement,  the 
Commission  carried  out  an  “operational  assessment”  with  the  assistance  of  an 
external  consultant  in  order  to  assess  the  soundness  of  financial  circuits  and 
administrative  controls.  On  the  basis  of  the  report,  the  existing  administrative 
procedures could be considered reliable. 
The Commission services also agreed with the authorities on the conditions for the 
release of the sixth (final) grant instalment of EUR 1.5 million under the assistance. 
The policy conditions focus mainly on short-term measures in the area of public 
finance management (treasury, internal and external audit reform) as well as on tax 
and  customs  administration  Shortcomings  in  tax  and  customs  administration  are 
prominent among the difficulties faced by foreign investors in Armenia, and these 
problems have been frequently on the agenda in EU-Armenia meetings in the context 
of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The Commission services are 
also monitoring the adoption of new anti-money laundering legislation. In addition to 
satisfactory implementation of the agreed policy measures, the payment of the grant 
will  be  conditional  on  repayment  of  Armenia  of  its  outstanding  debt  of  EUR  2 
million to the EC.  
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1.  Price liberalisation 
No administratively set prices other than for utilities exist. Administered prices account for 
8% of CPI basket. 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Liberal trade policy. Simple and relatively open import regime with a low average tariff 
structure. No quantitative restrictions. Accession to the WTO effective in February 2003.  
3.  Foreign exchange regime 
Floating exchange rate of the dram with limited official intervention by the Central Bank of 
Armenia. No restrictions on current international transfers in conformity with Article VIII of 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.  
4.  Foreign direct investment 
Liberal policy towards foreign direct investment. Absence of restrictions on repatriation of 
profits and capital. Net FDI inflows 5% of GDP (2003).  
5.  Monetary policy 
Low inflation environment maintained through prudent monetary policies conducted by the 
Central Bank of Armenia. 
6.  Public finances 
Total fiscal revenues incl. grants estimated at around 16% of GDP (2004), of which tax 
revenues about 14 ½ % of GDP. Total expenditure estimated at about 17% of GDP. Medium-
term expenditure framework has been integrated to the annual budget process, and a second 
generation treasury reform is underway.  
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
Private sector accounts for about 75% of GDP and employment. Most of commercially viable 
state-owned  enterprises  have  been  privatised  (approx.  7300  small  enterprises  and  2000 
medium and large scale enterprises). 
8.  Financial sector reform 
Minimum capital requirement will be increased to the equivalent of USD 5 million in 2005. A 
deposit insurance scheme will become operational in 2005.   
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4.  BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
4.1.  Executive summary 
During  2004,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  maintained  a  stable  macroeconomic 
environment, with inflation close to zero and growth rebounding from 3.5% of GDP 
in 2003 to an estimated 5% of GDP in 2004. After several consecutive years of fiscal 
consolidation,  the  budget  deficit  was  in  2004  contained  at  0.1%  of  GDP.  Public 
expenditure remains on a high level, at 46% of GDP in 2004, although a declining 
trend  has  been  achieved  over  the  last  years.  The  external  imbalances  remain 
significant, with a current account around 18% of GDP in 2004 despite increasing 
exports and inflows of FDI. 
The Feasibility Study, as adopted in November 2003 by the Commission, identified 
16 priorities on which BiH needs to make significant progress before further steps 
can be taken on negotiations of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). 
During 2004 the authorities have to a large degree focused on the related areas for 
their reform efforts.  
The implementation of the November 2002 Council Decision providing Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with up to EUR 60 million of macro-financial assistance is in the final 
stage of implementation. The first two tranches were disbursed, in February 2002 
and in December2003/January 2004 respectively, after sufficient compliance with 
the attached conditionality. The third tranche has not yet been released. The Council 
Decision, originally expiring on 9 November 2004, has been amended in December 
2004 by the Council to move forward the expiry date until 30 June 2005.  
4.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
After a dip in the GDP growth rate in 2003, growth picked up again during 2004 to 
around 5% of GDP. A rebound in agricultural production and a sizeable increase in 
industrial  production  contributed  positively  to  the  increased  growth.  Industrial 
production grew by 13.6% in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation) 
and by 10.3% in the Republika Srpska (RS) during the first three quarters of 2004 
compared with the same period in the previous year. In the Federation the increase 
was mainly attributed to the processing industry and the energy sector while in the 
RS  increasing  production  in  the  mining  industry  as  well  as  the  energy  sector 
contributed the most to the rise.  
BiH  inflation  is  expected  to  have  been  contained  to  around  zero  in  2004.  In 
September it stood, on an annual basis, at 0.1%, with an inflation rate of 1.9% in the 
RS against a mild deflationary trend of 0.5% in the Federation. Inflation in the RS 
has  traditionally  been  higher  than  in  the  Federation,  but  the  rates  are  steadily 
converging  in  the  two  entities.  Through  the  Currency  Board  arrangement  the 
Convertible Mark (KM) has been pegged to the euro at an unchanged rate since the 
introduction of the euro in January 1999. The level of gross official reserves has 
remained comfortable and covered around 4 months of imports in September 2004.  
The size of public expenditure has been reduced from 50% of GDP in 2002 to 46% 
of GDP in 2004. However, this remains still a relatively high level, in particular in  
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view  of  declining  aid  flows.  Nevertheless,  a  remarkable  fiscal  consolidation  has 
taken place, with the budget deficit after grants being reduced from 2.2% of GDP in 
2002 (7.3% before grants) to 0.4% in 2003 (3% before grants). For 2004 a slight 
deficit of 0.1% of GDP is expected.  
The  external  imbalances  continue  to  be  large,  mainly  driven  by  a  sizeable  trade 
deficit.  During  2004  a  few  large  privatisation  deals  materialised,  which  had  a 
positive impact on FDI inflows. An improved export performance was also noticed, 
with  exports  having  increased  by  24%  on  an  annual  basis  in  September  2004, 
however from a very low basis. Despite these positive developments, the current 
account deficit remained at around 18% of GDP. Imports continued to grow, a result 
of  increasing  consumer  demand  fuelled  by  the  continued  expansion  of  consumer 
loans. Credit expansion is expected to slow down in 2005 and thereby rein in import 
growth, and the current account deficit is projected to be slightly lower in 2005.  
External debt has been on the decline over the last years and is estimated to have 
equalled 34% of GDP at end 2004. An agreement on how to restructure and repay 
outstanding domestic debt claims was reached between the IMF and the authorities 
under  the  previous  IMF  programme.  The  deal  would,  if  implemented  as  agreed, 
increase domestic debt by around 10% of GDP.  
4.3.  Structural reforms 
In  November  2003  the  Commission  finalised  a  Feasibility  Study  concerning  the 
opening of negotiations on a SAA. It identifies 16 priorities on which BiH needs to 
make  significant  progress  before  the  Commission  recommends  to  the  Council  to 
open negotiations. During 2004 the Authorities have focused on related areas for 
their reform efforts and a large number of legislative measures have been adopted. In 
the economic sphere, the priority areas ranges from customs and taxation reforms, 
reforms on budget practice and legislation to the creation of a single economic space 
and trade related reforms.  
Reforms  in  the  area  of  public  finance  have  continued.  At  entity  levels,  the 
implementation of the Treasury system has been completed, which contributed to 
increase transparency and resulted in a better control over commitments and savings. 
Implementation has also been completed at cantonal level and is ongoing in the RS 
municipalities.  A  new  public  procurement  law  was  adopted  in  July  2004  and  is 
expected to improve the quality of financial management of BiH public institutions.  
An important area of reform has been indirect taxation and the creation of an Indirect 
Tax Authority (the ITA). The ITA board, comprising the finance ministers at Entity 
and State levels and their respective experts, started functioning during the first half 
of 2004. The main goals of the ITA will be to collect indirect taxes at the state-level, 
establish a unified customs administration and prepare the introduction of a state 
level VAT, which are important tasks in the context of strengthening of the single 
economic space and efficient revenue collection. An agreement on a single VAT rate 
of 17% was reached in 2004.  
Privatisation  of  public  enterprises  has  in  general  progressed  slowly.  The  most 
advanced is the privatisation of small-scale publicly owned enterprises, mostly sold 
to local buyers. Recent progress has been recorded as regards the privatisation of  
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larger and more strategically important enterprises, including large companies in the 
fields of mining and metal industry and these  sales are likely to have a positive 
impact on the BiH economy as a whole. However, most of the remaining publicly 
owned companies are expected to be more difficult to sell, some of the reasons for 
this  being  over-indebtedness  and  the  conditions  of  staffs’  eligibility  for  social 
benefits. Courts are not fully  capable of handling bankruptcy procedures and the 
large number of employees also complicates restructuring or liquidation and makes it 
a politically sensitive issue. These loss-making companies are a source of inefficient 
use of public resources, which negatively affects savings and investment. 
The banking system is one of the sectors in BiH were the most rapid reforms and 
structural transformation have taken place. By end 2003, 90% of total capital in the 
banking  sector  was  in  private  hands  and  the  sector  is  at  present  dominated  by 
foreign-owned banks. The regulatory framework as well as the enforcement of rules 
by the supervisory authorities has continued to be strengthened in 2004 and most 
banks do now also participate in the Deposit Insurance scheme. The sector has grown 
significantly during the last years: total assets of the banking sector increased from 
41% of GDP in 2001 to 58% of GDP in 2003. Lending increased by 37% in 2002 
and 25% in 2003, but the increase has so far been directed towards households rather 
than towards the corporate sector.  
4.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In November 2002 the Council approved Community macro-financial assistance of 
up to EUR 60 million to BiH (Decision 2002/883/EC), comprising a loan element of 
up to EUR 20 million and a grant element of up to EUR 40 million. The first tranche 
was disbursed in February 2003 (€15 million grant), following the approval by the 
IMF board of a new stand-by arrangement and the signature by the Commission and 
the  BiH  authorities  of  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)  laying  out  the 
conditionality attached to the first two tranches. The second tranche was released in 
December 2003 (EUR 10 million grant) and January 2004 (EUR 10 million loan).  
In June 2003 a Supplemental Memorandum of understanding was signed, outlining 
the economic policy conditions attached to the release of the third and last tranche of 
up  to  EUR  25  million.  The  conditions  cover  the  areas  of  public  finance  and 
administration  reform,  private  sector  and  business  environment,  financial  sector 
reform  and  the  area  of  statistics.  Some  of  the  conditions  were  closely  linked  to 
reforms in the context of the 16 priorities in the Feasibility Study.  
A  Commission  staff  mission  visited  Sarajevo  and  Banja  Luka  in  June  2004  and 
found that significant progress had been made as regards third tranche conditions, in 
particular concerning banking sector reform and public finance and administration 
reform. However, some conditions were not yet met and further actions from the side 
of the Authorities were required before disbursement could take place. In addition, in 
August  2004  Commission-appointed  consultants  performed  an  “operational 
assessment”, assessing the soundness of BiH’s financial circuits and administrative 
controls.  Based  on  the  operational  assessment’s  conclusions  the  Commission 
requested two measures to be implemented by the authorities before the third tranche 
could be disbursed. By the end of 2004, the economic policy conditions had been 
satisfactorily  fulfilled  by  the  authorities  but  further  information  (and  possibly 
actions) related to the two above-mentioned measures were still required.   
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In order to allow the full implementation of this assistance, and given the expiry of 
the  initial  Council  Decision  on  9 November  2004,  the  Commission  proposed  in 
September an extension of this assistance until 30 June 2005, which the Council 
approved on 7 December 2004 (Council Decision 2004/861/EC)
 2. 
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1.  Price liberalisation  
Most prices have been liberalised with the exception of a few selected public services. 
2.  Trade liberalisation  
BiH has started its process of negotiation to join the World Trade Organisation and has 
signed all the FTAs foreseen by the Stability Pact’s Memorandum of Understanding on 
trade. 
3.  Exchange regime  
Since  June  1998  BiH  has  a  Currency  Board  Arrangement  under  which  the  national 
currency, the Convertible Mark (KM), is pegged to the Euro at the fixed rate of 1.96 KM.  
4.  Foreign direct investment  
Inflows  of  FDI  have  been  hampered  by  the  weak  business  climate  and  inconsistent 
frameworks between the two entities. Efforts during the last years to reduce bureaucracy 
and improve the overall business environment have to some extent succeeded and FDI 
increased by 20% during the first half of 2004 compared to first half of 2003.  
5.  Monetary policy  
The Central Bank of BiH is responsible for operating the Currency Board Arrangement and 
this  arrangement  limits the  scope  of  monetary  policy.  The  CBBH  and  other  banks  are 
prohibited from lending money to the government.  
6.  Public finances  
The share of public spending in GDP has been on a declining trend over the last years but 
remains large at around 46% of GDP in 2004, and public expenditure is often associated 
with large inefficiencies. However, significant fiscal consolidation has been achieved over 
time, together with tax harmonisation between entities. An important customs and taxation 
reform is underway (including VAT introduction). 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring  
While  the  privatisation  of  small  and  medium  enterprises  is  virtually  complete  in  both 
Entities,  progress  on  the  sale  of  large-scale  ‘strategic’  enterprises,  which  could  attract 
foreign investors, has lagged behind. In 2004 a few large privatisations with foreign buyers 
materialised, but remaining public companies are expected to be difficult to sell and are a 
source of inefficient use of resources. 
8.  Financial sector reform  
Banking supervision has continued to be strengthened and regulation improved. A Deposit 
Insurance Scheme covers most banks. The banking sectors in the two entities are still partly 
fragmented  and  are  under  the  supervision  of  two  separate  agencies.  However,  the  two 
agencies are expected to be put under the umbrella of the Central Bank.   
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5.  GEORGIA 
5.1.  Executive summary 
The Georgian economy continued to perform well in 2004. The reduction in the real 
GDP growth from 11.1% (revised figure for 2003) to 8.4% in 2004 is mainly due to 
negative growth in the agricultural sector. The construction of oil and gas pipelines 
through Georgia brought an additional stimulus which had spill over effects in the 
services sector. 
Inflation  remained  broadly  unchanged  at  7.5%  although  the  market  driven 
appreciation of the Georgian lari did help to contain further inflationary pressures 
originating from the legalisation of the economy. The current account deficit (around 
7.5% of GDP) did not deteriorate as much as expected because workers’ remittances 
and other current transfers compensated for the increased import demand (mainly 
related  to  the  pipeline  projects).  The  new  Government  reinvigorated  structural 
reforms in several areas and progress was visible already in the short-term. 
Georgia resumed borrowing from the IMF in June 2004. The first review under the 
three-year  PRGF  arrangement  was  completed  in  December.  Under  the  EC’s 
Exceptional Financial Assistance, a grant tranche of EUR 6.5 million was paid in 
December after the Commission services had assessed the soundness of the financial 
circuits related to the management of this assistance in Georgia. The grant tranche 
had  been  pending  since  early  2003  when  the  condition  on  satisfactory 
implementation of the IMF-supported program was breached. 
In June 2004, the Commission co-chaired with the World Bank a donors’ conference 
on Georgia at which a total of EUR 850 million was pledged, including EC’s pledge 
of EUR 125 million. 
5.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
According to preliminary estimates, real GDP growth remained robust in 2004 at 
8.4% (11.1% in 2003) despite negative growth in the agricultural sector (-3.6%). 
Manufacturing  and  construction  were  driving  growth.  Industrial  production  is 
estimated to have increased by 17%. The large oil and gas pipeline projects had also 
spill over effects in the services sector. Recent estimates indicate that the share of 
informal  economy  in  the  total  output  started  to  decline  in  2004  following  the 
authorities’ actions against tax evasion. The national accounts may therefore also 
reflect inclusion of previously unaccounted activities. Estimates on the share of the 
shadow economy range from 40 up to 60%.  
The  fiscal  policy  was  on  a  sound  basis  in  2004 owing  to  strong  performance  in 
revenue collection as a result of effective measures taken against tax evasion by the 
new Government. Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are estimated at about 18% 
(14.5% in 2003). On cash basis, the fiscal deficit is estimated at around 1.5% of GDP 
as the stock of expenditure arrears was reduced rapidly, whereas on commitments 
basis a small surplus is estimated given some delays in planned capital expenditures. 
The  Government  expects  that  it  will  be  able  to  clear  all  outstanding  domestic 
expenditure arrears in 2005. These arrears totalled approximately 5% of GDP at the  
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end of 2003. Domestic public debt was equivalent to about 11% of GDP at the end of 
2004 (15% the year before). Yields on treasury bills have declined from a peak of 
77% (October 2003) to 16% in February 2005. 
Supported  by  steady  re-monetisation,  the  National  Bank  of  Georgia  (NBG)  has 
maintained a consistently prudent monetary policy stance. In 2004 the NBG allowed 
a market driven appreciation of the lari in order to contain inflationary expectations. 
The  12-month  consumer  price  inflation  stood  broadly  unchanged  at  7.5%  in 
December 2004 (7% the year before). The NBG intervened, however, in the foreign 
exchange  market  to  smooth  the  appreciation  trend,  beginning  to  sterilise  its 
interventions  towards  the  end  of  the  year  through  the  limited  instruments  at  its 
disposal. Nevertheless, the lari appreciated about 15% in real effective terms during 
2004. The demand for lari increased partly as a result of the Government’s actions 
against tax evasion and smuggling. Dollarization has been persistent in Georgia, but 
in 2004 the share of foreign currency deposits started to decline to below 80% of all 
deposits for the first time in several years. 
The  increase  in  the  current  account  deficit  (due  to  high  import  demand  for  the 
construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline) was not as high as expected given 
the  strong  inflows  of  remittances  and  other  current  transfers.  According  to 
preliminary estimates, the current account deficit was about 7.5% of GDP (7.2% in 
2003). The gross international reserves of the NBU increased substantially during 
2004, but still covered only two months of imports at the end of the year.  
Georgia’s  public  external  debt  remained  broadly  unchanged  in  nominal  terms  at 
about  USD  1.8  billion,  while  as  a  ratio  to  GDP  the  external  debt  decreased 
substantially from 46% in 2003 to about 37% at the end of 2004. During the second 
half of 2004, Georgia concluded agreements with most of its bilateral creditors (most 
importantly with Russia) in line with the July 2004 Paris Club agreement which is 
expected to reduce debt service due to Paris Club creditors from USD 169.2 million 
to  USD  46.4  million  (under  “Houston  terms”)  over  three  years.  The  Paris  Club 
creditors  also  expressed  their  willingness  to  consider  a  debt  treatment  under  the 
Evian  Approach  on  terms  tailored  to  Georgia’s  debt  situation  after  the  current 
agreement expires provided that Georgia has demonstrated a satisfactory track record 
by that time.  
5.3.  Structural reform 
During the first year in office the new Government made progress in tackling tax 
evasion,  smuggling  and  corruption.  The  civil  service  has  been  downsized 
dramatically while public sector wages are being increased. About 30,000 positions 
were cut (23% of the public workforce) the largest cuts being in the traffic police and 
internal security. Tax and customs offices were also restructured and the number of 
staff retrenched. Privatisation has been resumed, including new legislation on land 
privatisation which had effectively stalled some years ago (75% of land still remains 
in state ownership). A list of 372 non-strategic assets, including several from the 
Autonomous Republic of Adjara, was drawn for privatisation in the short-term. Most 
remaining state-owned SMEs are expected to be sold fairly quickly without major 
problems while in case of larger enterprises careful preparation and transparency of 
tender procedures would be important for successful privatisation.   
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A new liberal tax code became effective in January 2005 following the examples 
from several Eastern European countries. The number of taxes was reduced from 21 
to 8. A flat-rate personal income tax (12%) replaced marginal rates between 12 and 
20%, and the payroll tax was reduced from 33% to 20%. The VAT rate will be 
reduced from 20% to 18% in mid-2005. These revenue losses are compensated by 
raising excise taxes and by eliminating various exemptions. To boost the legalisation 
of  the  informal  economy,  fiscal  amnesty  is  provided  for  undeclared  income  and 
property acquired before the end  of 2003 (government officials are excluded).  A 
revision of the customs code is also planned. 
Under the new Budget System Law, significant steps were taken in public finance 
management  reforms  during  2004,  including  effective  introduction  of  a  single 
treasury revenue account, improvement of commitments control and consolidation of 
extra-budgetary  funds  in  the  budget  system.  The  VAT  refund  mechanism  has 
become  fully  operational.  Preparations  for  the  introduction  of  a  Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (as of the 2006 state budget) were also launched, supported 
by the EC and other donors. 
Progress is also expected in other key areas, such as the energy sector rehabilitation, 
which would however require substantial new investments over several years as only 
some very basic repairs have been made so far. The IMF has estimated that in 2004 
the energy sector’s quasi-fiscal losses were reduced somewhat to about 4.5% of GDP 
(4.9% in 2003) following a gradual increase in electricity cash collections from main 
customers. Measures were also taken to reduce the theft of electricity but technical 
losses remain large. The legacy debt of the energy sector still has to be dealt with 
(estimated to total at least the equivalent of EUR 400 million). Electricity generating 
companies  are  being  prepared  for  privatisation,  starting  from  2005.  A  new 
Regulatory  Commission  has  been  appointed  to  oversee  the  energy  sector  and  it 
enjoys independence in setting energy tariffs. 
In May 2004 Georgia  ratified the Council of Europe Convention on  Laundering, 
Search,  Seizure  and  Confiscation  of  the  Proceeds  from  Crime,  and  is  currently 
considering how to further improve the anti-money laundering system in the country. 
The banking sector is being consolidated through increases in the minimum capital 
requirements for commercial banks from GEL 5 million to GEL 12 million (approx. 
EUR 5 million) by 2008. The NBG has also strengthened regulations on single party 
and connected lending. The ratio of non-performing loans to total commercial bank 
loans decreased from 7.5% to 5.5% during 2004. The development of the non-bank 
financial sector is still in its infancy.  
5.4.  Implementation of exceptional financial assistance 
Following  the  regime  change  after  the  resignation  of  president  Shevardnadze  in 
November 2003, the new Government engaged quickly in discussions with the IMF 
staff on a successor arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. 
The IMF Board approved a new three-year PRGF-supported program for Georgia on 
4 June 2004 in the amount of SDR 98 million. Thereafter, the Commission services 
were in a position to resume the exceptional financial assistance to Georgia which 
had been effectively off track in parallel with the previous IMF-program since early 
2003.  
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European Community’s exceptional financial assistance had been made available to 
Georgia in the form of a loan of EUR 110 million (disbursed in July 1998) and a total 
grant  amount  of  up  to  EUR  65  million  foreseen  to  be  paid  in  several  annual 
instalments.  Altogether  four  grant  instalments,  in  the  total  amount  of  EUR  31.5 
million,  were  paid  under  the  assistance  in  the  period  1998-2004.  Through  early 
principal repayments, Georgia has reduced the outstanding amount of its debt to the 
Community to EUR 85.5 million. Repayments of the debt are scheduled to start in 
2009. 
The conditions for the release of the fourth grant instalment had been agreed with the 
Georgian authorities in early 2002. One year later, in the light of the mixed progress 
in the implementation of the policy measures, the Commission services agreed with 
the Georgian authorities to set the amount of the grant instalment at EUR 6.5 million 
(instead of the maximum amount of EUR 11.5 million), conditional on an early debt 
repayment by Georgia to the EC. After Georgia had reached agreement with the IMF 
in June 2004, the EC agreed to limit the amount of the early debt repayment to EUR 
6.5 million. Before proceeding with the payment of the grant in December 2004, the 
Commission  conducted  an  Operational  Assessment  of  the  financial  circuits  and 
administrative  procedures  related  to  the  management  of  the  macro-financial 
assistance in Georgia. The Assessment showed that substantial progress had been 
made at the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Georgia in the relevant 
areas.  
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1.  Price liberalisation 
No administratively set prices exist outside the utilities sector. Administered prices account 
for about 3% of the CPI basket. 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Liberal trade  policy.  Georgia  has  been  member  of  the  WTO  since June 2002.  Based  on 
margins allowed during WTO accession Georgia raised the number of tariff bands and the 
maximum tariff which led to an increase in the weighted average tariff to about 11%. Non-
tariff barriers allowed for environmental, security and health reasons only in line with the 
PCA.  
3.  Foreign exchange regime 
Floating exchange rate of the lari with limited official intervention by the National Bank of 
Georgia. No restrictions on current international transactions in conformity with Article VIII 
of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
Adequate overall legislation. Unlimited repatriation of capital and profits. Net inflows of FDI 
8% of GDP. 
5.  Monetary policy 
Prudent monetary policy has contributed to the stabilisation of the inflation at a low level. 
Dollarisation  of  the  economy  remains  high  (slightly  below  80%  of  total  deposits  are  in 
foreign exchange).  
6.  Public finances 
Total  fiscal  revenues  (including  grants)  estimated  at  21%  of  GDP  (2004),  of  which  tax 
revenues 18% of GDP. Total expenditure and net lending estimated at about 20% of GDP 
(2004). Under the new Budget System Law, which became effective on January 1, 2004, the 
treasury system is being reformed, including the introduction of a Single Treasury Account 
System. A new liberal tax code is effective as of January 1, 2005.  
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
The  private  sector  accounts  for  about  65%  of  GDP.  Small  scale  privatisation  largely 
completed while large scale privatisation continued to face problems. A new privatisation 
programme of 372 non-strategic companies underway in 2004 and 2005. New legislation 
under discussion on accelerating land privatisation. 
8.  Financial sector reform 
There are 24 operating banks (of which 6 foreign-owned). Further consolidation is expected 
as the minimum capital requirement will be increased to GEL 12 million (approx. EUR 4.6 
million) by 2008.  
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6.  MOLDOVA 
6.1.  Executive summary 
The upswing that began in 2000 continued in 2004, as year-on-year GDP growth 
exceeded 7%. Growing exports and buoyant remittances from Moldavians working 
abroad continue to drive the economy's expansion. Domestic demand is strong and 
industrial production is continuing its recovery.  
Although  exports  grew  strongly,  the  dynamics  of  imports  were  even  more 
pronounced, so that Moldova’s large trade deficit rose further. As a result, the current 
account deficit rose too, reaching around 7% of GDP.  
Inflation that had accelerated sharply on the back of sustained money supply growth 
in 2003 moderated gradually in 2004 but was still well above 10%: the consumer 
price index rose by 12.5%, compared to 4.4% in 2002.  
Fiscal policy was loosened considerably in the run-up to parliamentary election in 
spring 2005; a financing gap in the general government account emerged, as increase 
in  spending  overshot  significantly  additional  budget  revenue.  Thanks  to  debt 
restructuring agreements with several public and private creditors, the public debt-to-
GDP ratio has dropped further significantly, to around 36%, the burden of servicing 
debts  remains  high  (debt  service  due  would  absorb  nearly  one  fifth  of  central 
government revenues).  Hence, dependence on  capital flows from multilateral and 
bilateral  creditors  is  set  to  remain  high  in  the  medium  term.  Also,  Moldova  has 
reduced significantly its stock of arrears, while still accumulating some new arrears.  
Despite  progress  in  adopting  some  new  legislation  and  introducing  some 
deregulation,  the  overall  situation  in  the  area  of  structural  reform  remains 
disappointing.  About  half  of  the  economy  is  still  controlled  by  the  State,  the 
government interferes in the economic activity heavily and in a non-transparent way 
and corruption is pervasive.  In May 2004 the government adopted the Economic 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper but serious questions remain on the 
authorities’ commitment to implement it. 
Moldova received no EC-macro-financial assistance in 2004. Disbursements under 
the  grant  of  EUR  15  million  approved  in  December  2002  could  not  start  in  the 
absence of a working financing arrangement with the IMF 
6.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Moldova's economic recovery continued in 2004, with real GDP growth accelerating 
from 6.3% the year-before to 7.3%. The upswing is driven by sustained growth in 
Moldova’s main trading partners Russia and Ukraine and, more importantly, by a 
rising domestic demand resulting from booming workers’ remittances. Both exports 
and imports grew strongly, by about 25% in current dollar terms. As a result, the 
trade deficit increased further in absolute terms but remained broadly unchanged as 
part of GDP (at about one third).  
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Inflation that had picked up in 2003 – the twelve-month consumer price index (CPI) 
had reached its highest point of 17% in October 2003 – moderated gradually in 2004 
to an end-year figure of some 12.5%. Inflation has been fuelled by strong domestic 
spending  accommodated  by  rapid  money  growth  resulting  from  continued  large 
inflows of remittances. Easing of inflationary pressures allowed the National Bank of 
Moldova (NBM) to step up its interventions on the foreign exchange market during 
2004 in order to accumulate international reserves and contain the appreciation of 
leu, Moldova’s currency. The build up of inflationary pressures in 2003-2004 (the 
CPI had increased less than 5% in 2002) raises the issue of the right balance between 
different, sometimes conflicting, policy objectives of the NBM. The National Bank is 
expected to switch to somewhat tighter monetary policy aimed  at bringing down 
inflation while continuing building up reserves. 
In the run-up to parliamentary election in spring 2005, the fiscal stance during 2004 
was loosened considerably. While revenue performance exceeded the original budget 
projections (owing to aggressive tax collection and higher-than-expected inflation), 
primary expenditure overshot the budget plans by an estimated 2.5% of GDP. With 
limited non-tax financing (revenue from external grants and privatisation receipts 
was well below expectations), the government had to increasingly make recourse to 
bank financing and continued to run arrears on bilateral debt (at the same time it had 
resumed some payments to the Paris Club although arrears remain to be cleared). As 
a result, the central budget surplus was cut from USD 27.4 million to USD 5 million. 
The general government account in 2004 turned to a deficit of more than 1% of 
GDP, both on cash and commitment basis, from a surplus in 2003. It is expected to 
increase to 2.5% of GDP in 2005.  
In the course of 2004, Moldova has managed to cut its public external debt to below 
USD 1 billion or 36% of GDP (down from 52% of GDP one year earlier). Non-
publicly guaranteed external debt is of a comparable amount. The current level of 
Moldova’s debt reflects a series of restructuring agreements that have reduced the 
value of the outstanding debt over time. The latest debt deals covered debt owed to 
the Russian gas supplier Gazprom (that reduced total debt by over $60 million), the 
U.S. firm Hewlett-Packard, Turkey’s EXIM Bank and Romania. Debt arrears were 
also  reduced  by  half  (from  USD  86  million  at  end-2003  to  an  estimated  USD 
41million  at  end-2004)  through  buybacks  and  rescheduling.  Yet,  arrears  still 
represented  more  than  2%  of  GDP,  out  of  which  nearly  half  in  new  arrears 
accumulated in 2004. Servicing of the debt remains a difficult and challenging task: 
in  2004,  payments  falling  due  amounted  to  nearly  20%  of  central  government 
revenue. Given low foreign exchange reserves (just two months of imports) and the 
substantial structural current account deficit, which has worsened over time and in 
2003-2004  accounted  for  around  7%  of  GDP,  the  country  is  expected  to  remain 
dependent on additional support from the IFIs and bilateral donors. Indeed, the large 
official  transfers,  and  a  high  level  of  remittances  from  abroad  can  only  partly 
mitigate the chronically high merchandise trade deficit.  
6.3.  Structural reform 
In the initial phases of transition, in the 1990s, when it implemented successfully the 
first generation of reforms, Moldova was considered as one of the most advanced 
reformers in the CIS. Reform momentum lapsed subsequently, not least as a result of 
political shifts. Although the government remains basically committed to free-market  
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policies, implementation has generally been slow and hesitant. The most frequent 
complaints  are  that  the  administration  tends  to  interfere  heavily  and  in  a  non-
transparent manner in the business activity; that there is widespread corruption; that 
the burden of complying with regulations even on minor issues is extremely heavy, 
and  finally,  that  foreign  investors  are  discriminated  against  or  harassed.  Two 
important  foreign  investors,  France’s  Lafarge  and  Spain’s  Union  Fenosa,  were 
involved in high-profile disputes that lasted for years and were only recently sorted 
out (successfully).  
There have been no fundamental changes in this respect in 2004 even if attempts 
were made to improve conditions for business activity and SME development and 
attract foreign investment. So, the authorities made real efforts to simplify licensing 
and  business  registration  requirements  and  introduced  new  legislation  on 
microfinance and investment (the new investment law unifies treatment of domestic 
and foreign investors). Also, they approved a new anti-corruption strategy and made 
some  progress  in  the  fiscal  reform.  Yet,  at  the  same  time,  the  government’s 
interventions  in  the  economy  remained  widespread,  formal  and  informal  trade 
restrictions  are  still  in  place  and  there  has  been  virtually  no  progresses  in 
privatisation – the government-owned enterprises still produce about half of the total 
output. The result is that Moldova’s business environment is still considered to be 
among the most difficult in the region and investments are very low. 
One  more  attempt  to  make  a  new  start  in  structural  reform  in  Moldova  was  the 
adoption  by  the  government  of  the  final  version  of  the  Economic  Growth  and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (EGPRSP) in May 2004. The EGPRSP covers the 
period from 2004 to 2006; it includes a poverty diagnosis, sectored programmes and 
an  overall  policy  strategy  addressing  the  issues  of  sustainable  economic  growth, 
human development and social protection and inclusion. The strategy identifies a 
sound  business  environment,  prudent  macroeconomic  management  and  better 
infrastructure as key prerequisites for sustainable growth. The EGPRSP also includes 
the  costing  of  the  proposed  programmes  within  a  Medium-Term  Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF).  
In  the  IMF-World  Bank  Joint  Staff  Assessment  (JSA)  of  the  Moldova  EGPRSP 
completed  at  end-2004,  the  two  institutions,  while  giving  it  a  cautious  overall 
positive judgement, identified a number of weaknesses. These might  be captured 
under two headings – weaknesses of the strategy itself and implementation risks.  
Weaknesses of the strategy refer essentially to the financing of the EGPRSP. The 
existing MTEF is not considered realistically capable of bringing Moldova’s public 
finance on a sustainable footing. The MTEF contains revenue projections that seem 
too optimistic; furthermore, it assumes large unidentified financing and a continued 
default on scheduled amortisation payments to some bilateral creditors. Also, the 
MTEF  projects  marked  increases  in  public  sector  wages  and,  more  generally,  in 
public expenditure; the costing of many programmes is questionable. The implicit 
assumption,  that  Moldova  would  reach  agreement  on  an  IMF  programme,  thus 
unlocking  financial  support  from  IFIs  and  donors,  also  looks  optimistic  at  this 
juncture. At the same time, a significant part of the spending envisaged under the 
EGPRSP  has  not  been  included  in  the  MTEF,  which  calls  into  question  the 
implementation of many of the measures foreseen in the strategy. The apparent lack  
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of  resources  suggests  that  the  EGPRSP  does  not  at  present  prioritise  sufficiently 
between different expenditure needs. 
Coming to the implementation risks, a major issue appears to be ownership of the 
EGPRSP.  There  is  indeed  much  scepticism  about  the  political  commitment  the 
strategy enjoys, not least given that it departs markedly from the government’s 2001 
Economic Revival Programme. It has been noted by many observers that actions on 
the ground seem to contradict heavily the spirit of the EGPRSP.  
6.4.  Implementation of exceptional financial assistance 
Between  1994  and  2000,  the  European  Community  provided  to  Moldova  three 
macro-financial assistance packages in the form of medium-term loans. The first two 
packages worth EUR 45 million and EUR 15 million were disbursed. Moldova has 
so  far  serviced  scrupulously  its  external  financial  obligations  towards  the 
Community. The last MFA loan package amounting to EUR 15 million, decided in 
2000, was cancelled in December 2002 and replaced by a grant of an equivalent 
amount.  
The implementation of the Community MFA grant to Moldova that could not start in 
2003 in the absence of a working financing arrangement with the IMF was still on 
hold in 2004. The Council Decision on the grant assistance expires at the end of 
2005.  
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1.  Price liberalisation 
Most prices have been liberalised. 
2.  Trade liberalisation  
Relatively liberal international trade policy on paper, but formal or informal restrictions on 
some key commodities exist (notably sunflower seed ad scrap metal). Moldova became a 
member of the WTO in June 2000.  
3.  Exchange regime  
The leu is convertible for current account operations. Floating exchange rate. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  
Unlimited repatriation of capital and profits and no limitations on holding foreign currency 
bank accounts. Adequate overall legislation, but implementation is often problematic, which 
weakens the business climate. A new investment law introducing equal treatment of domestic 
and  foreign  investors  adopted  in  2004.  There  had  been  a  trend  toward  increasing 
administrative interference on foreign investors, notably in the energy sector. FDI has been 
declining. 
5.  Monetary policy 
High money supply growth, due largely to un-sterilised forex accumulation, have led to a 
sharp acceleration of inflation. Some slowing of inflation achieved in the second half of 2004. 
The National Bank expected to pursue a tighter policy course aimed at curbing inflation 
further while still continuing to accumulate forex reserves.  
6.  Public finances  
Fiscal stance loosened in 2004. While budget revenue increased as a result of strengthened 
fiscal discipline, expenditure grew more. The result was a return to a small deficit in the 
general government account. Widening of the deficit is expected in 2005. Public external debt 
was cut to about 36% of GDP following debt buybacks and re-scheduling. Foreign debt 
arrears were reduced by half to 2% of GDP but new arrears appeared. 2004 debt service 
absorbed over one fifth of central government revenue.  
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring  
Structural  reforms  have  slowed.  The  transformation  to  a  market  economy  is  far  from 
complete. Privatisation of the key economic sectors suffered delays and are currently made 
difficult  by  bad  market  sentiment.  However,  some  limited  simplification  of  rules  for 
businesses  was  introduced  in  2004.  An  EGPRSP  was  adopted  in  2004  which  identified 
necessary structural reforms. 
8.  Financial sector reform  
The financial  sector  is in  a  relatively  good  shape,  but  further  strengthening  is  crucial  to 
mobilize  savings  and  promote  investment.  Although  the  share  of  bad  loans  has  been 
declining,  given  rapid  credit  growth,  attention  will  have  to  be  maintained  to  prevent 
vulnerabilities.   
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7.  ROMANIA 
7.1.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Since 1991, the EU has supported Romania’s transition process through four macro-
financial assistance operations. The latest one was approved in November 1999 when 
the EU Council granted Romania a balance-of-payments loan of up to EUR 200 
million (Council Decision 99/732/EC), within the framework of a SDR 400 million 
IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA). After the release of the first EUR 100 million 
tranche in June 2000, however, the IMF programme went off-track and eventually 
expired. No further disbursements of EC macro-financial assistance could therefore 
take place. 
In January 2002, pursuant to Council decision 99/732/EC, the EU Council agreed in 
principle to make available to Romania EUR 100 million in two sub-tranches subject 
to  the  satisfactory  implementation  of  a  18-month  SBA  agreed  with the  IMF  and 
provided the country makes adequate progress in its structural adjustment process. 
A Supplemental  Loan  Agreement  and  a  Supplemental  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  (SMOU)  were  signed  in  November  2002.  Conditions  for  the 
disbursement of the first sub-tranche of EUR 50 million were fulfilled in the first half 
of 2003, and disbursement took place on 17 July 2003. 
In the context of a 24-month SBA agreed with the IMF on 7 July 2004, which in the 
absence  of  any  immediate  balance-of-payments  financing  needs  is  considered  a 
precautionary arrangement only, i.e. without any foreseen disbursements by the IMF, 
it was decided on 16 July 2004 to deactivate the MFA operation with Romania. 
Council Decision 99/732/EC providing the legal framework for the operation will 
remain  in  force.  Should  the  need  arise  in  the  future,  this  assistance  could  be 
reactivated.   
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8.  SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO  
8.1.  Executive summary 
The economic performance of Serbia and Montenegro has improved in 2004 due to 
strong domestic demand driven by real wage increases and rapid credit growth. GDP 
is estimated to have grown by 7.2%, reflecting a recovery in industrial output and a 
rebound in agricultural production. Inflation has accelerated and reached 13.4%. The 
external  sector  remains  vulnerable  given  the  country’s  weak  export  performance. 
Financing  requirements  continue  to  be  high,  resulting  from  rising  debt  service 
obligations,  as  well  as  investment  needs  and  buoyant  private  and  government 
consumption. In Serbia, reform momentum has partly been regained following the 
creation of a new government in March 2004. In particular, a large number of laws in 
the  economic  and  financial  sphere  have  been  adopted  by  the  Serbian  Parliament 
since then. However, privatisation efforts slowed in the first part of 2004 and the 
restructuring of large socially owned enterprises and public utilities has not started 
yet. The payment of the third tranche under the current macro-financial assistance to 
the  country  was  delayed  due  to  insufficient  progress  in  implementing  structural 
reforms. However, reform momentum was regained in the second half of 2004 and 
the grant element of the third tranche of EUR 10 million was paid in December 2004, 
leaving the last disbursement of the loan element of EUR 15 million to be made in 
2005. 
8.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
In  2004,  real  GDP  growth  in  Serbia  and  Montenegro  reached  7.2%,  reflecting  a 
robust recovery in agricultural production and rising industrial output. Twelve-month 
inflation (end-period) accelerated in Serbia to 13.7% in 2004 (from 7.6% in 2003), 
driven by buoyant domestic demand, increases in administered prices and the rising 
cost of fuel imports. In Montenegro twelve-month inflation reached 3.4% in 2004. 
In 2004, the consolidated general budget deficit of Serbia was reduced to 1.7% of 
GDP. Reflecting strong domestic demand and improved tax enforcement efforts, the 
revenue performance of the republican and local budgets was better than expected. In 
particular customs and excise revenues grew strongly. Expenditures were generally 
under tight control, although new social security arrears vis-à-vis the private sector 
was recorded. In Montenegro, the budget deficit reached 2.5% in 2004, better than 
projected. 
In 2004, the National Bank of Serbia followed a policy to balance the objective of 
maintaining price stability with external competitiveness and continued to implement 
its flexible managed float” policy. As a result, the nominal effective exchange rate 
depreciated by over 15% and in real terms depreciated by 3-4%. 
The current account deficit of Serbia increased further in 2004 and is estimated to 
have reached 13% of GDP, boosted by rising import. While export growth lagged 
behind, exports accelerated in the second half of 2004, partially as an effect of past 
privatisations. Private remittances continued to be high at 14% of GDP while FDI 
reached a mere 4% of GDP, reflecting a slowdown of privatisation in the first half of 
the year. Net foreign reserves rose to about EUR 3 billion (3.2 months of projected  
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2005 imports at end December 2004). In Montenegro, the current account deficit is 
estimated to have reached about 10% of GDP in 2004, with FDI inflows of about 
EUR 50 million, mainly in the form of investments in the tourism sector. 
The completion of negotiations with the London Club of creditors contributed to 
reduce the level of external debt by 7% of GDP. However, an increasing share of the 
external deficit is financed by debt which has contributed in keeping the debt-to-
GDP ratio at a projected 56% of GDP at end-2004. Therefore, external sustainability 
remains a major challenge for Serbia and Montenegro, since debt service obligations 
are projected to rise materially to about 4% of GDP and 16% of exports of goods and 
services in 2005. 
8.3.  Structural Reforms 
With respect to structural reforms some new momentum has been gained following 
the  creation  of  a  new  government  in  Serbia  in  March  2004.  In  particular,  a 
substantial legislative agenda has been submitted to the Serbian Parliament. Around 
50 new laws, mainly in the economic and financial sphere, have been adopted in the 
second half of 2004 or were by the end of the year in the process of being voted, 
notably on bankruptcy, investment promotion, company registration, foreign trade, 
insurance,  indirect  taxation,  and  energy  and  railway.  Moreover,  the  process  of 
privatisation seems to be on the way to regain momentum. Tenders for three banks 
have been opened by September and more were expected to follow in due course. 
However the restructuring of large socially owned enterprises and public utilities, 
which  has  not  yet  really  started,  still  represents  a  major  challenge  for  economic 
policies in the future. 
With increasingly less marketable enterprises in the pipeline, privatisation receipts 
have declined in 2004. Following rapid privatisation of socially-owned enterprises 
through  tenders,  auctions,  and  share  sales  in  2003,  the  process  slowed  down 
considerably in early 2004, reflecting political developments and a legal challenge to 
the modalities of share sales. Despite the new government’s renewed commitment to 
privatisation  in  the  second  half  of  2004,  successful  sales  of  socially-owned 
enterprises have declined given the predominance of less attractive heavily indebted 
and overstaffed enterprises in the pipeline.  
In Montenegro, the Niksic steel company was sold in May 2004, and tenders have 
been  launched  for  large  enterprises  including  major  units  of  the  Podgorica 
Aluminium  Plant  (KAP),  the  tobacco  company  and  the  state  telecommunications 
monopoly. The government has offered 13 hotels for sale, of which nine have been 
sold.  
Bank privatisation has gathered new pace in Serbia in 2004. By end-June, reporting 
and  control  mechanisms  have  been  strengthened  in  all  banks  with  majority  state 
ownership to preserve their value prior to privatization/resolution, and essentially all 
London  Club  obligations  will  be  converted  into  state  equity,  removing  an 
impediment  to  privatization.  Following  the  successful  launch  of  the  first  bank 
privatization tender in spring 2004  for Jubanka, tenders for two additional banks 
(Novosadska and Continental Banka) were launched in the fall of 2004.  
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As of end 2003, in Montenegro 10 banks were active. Progress in bank privatisation 
and supervision continued in 2004. The government intended to launch international 
tenders by mid-2005 to sell one of the largest banks, and to prepare a strategy to 
divest all remaining state-minority holdings in banks. Efforts to collect assets carved 
out from the banking sector will be intensified. The Central Bank of Montenegro has 
implemented most of the Basel Core Principles, and is working on implementing the 
remaining  ones.  A  Financial  Investigation  Unit  was  recently  created  as  foreseen 
according to the Anti-Money Laundering Law. 
8.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Following a first EUR 345 million packages implemented in 2001/2002, the Council 
decided in early November 2002 to provide the country with Community macro-
financial  assistance  of  up  to  €130  million.  The  objective  of  this  assistance  is  to 
underpin  economic  policies  in  the  context  of  the  three-year  IMF  Extended 
Arrangement (2002-2005) approved in May 2002 and in particular to support the 
balance of payments and strengthen the foreign exchange position of the country. A 
Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)  was  negotiated  and  agreed  between  the 
Commission  Services  and  the  authorities  in  December  2002.  It  specified  the 
economic policy conditions and structural measures for the release of the second and 
the third tranche of this assistance. The authorities have agreed to allocate 90% of the 
proceeds under this assistance to Serbia and 10% to Montenegro. 
The first and second tranches, respectively of EUR 40 million and EUR 65 million 
were released in 2002 and 2003. The implementation of the third, EUR 25 million, 
tranche was delayed until late 2004 due to lack of progress in the implementation of 
a number of structural reforms. 
In addition, in July 2004, DG ECFIN commissioned an external consultant with the 
task  to  assess  the  administrative  procedures  and  financial  circuits  of  the  Finance 
Ministries  and  Central  Banks,  and  the  processes  involved  in  macro-financial 
assistance  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  beneficiary  countries  of  MFA  maintain  a 
sufficient control environment. These assessments concluded that for both Republics 
a framework for sound financial management of the Finance Ministry and Central 
Bank is effective regarding the formal internal control requirements. However, in the 
case of Serbia, additional measures were recommended to strengthen the framework 
of financial control at the Finance Ministry. In light of these findings, it was agreed 
with  the  authorities  to  implemented  additional  measures,  before  the  third  MFA 
tranche was paid. 
Following further progress in the second half of 2004, compliance with the agreed 
conditionality and with the additional measures as regards strengthening financial 
control, was considered by the end of the year as satisfactory, enabling the release of 
the third tranche. The grant element of EUR 10 million was paid in December 2004, 
leaving the EUR 15 million loan element to be paid in 2005. 
In November 2003, the Council also decided to increase the current macro-financial 
package by EUR 70 million to up to EUR 200 million the EC assistance, through a 
revision of the Council  Decision of November  2002, in order to help  addressing 
additional  financing  needs  identified  by  the  IMF  in  the  context  of  the  current 
stabilisation programme. Pending compliance with the third tranche conditions the  
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modalities of this additional assistance, including the precise tranching and attached 
conditionality, still remained to be negotiated with the authorities, and, in preparation 
of that, a Commission services mission took place in February 2005. 
In order to allow the full implementation of this assistance, and given the expiry of 
the  initial  Council  Decision  on  9  November  2004,  the  Commission  proposed  in 
September an extension of this assistance until 30 June 2006, which the Council 
approved on 7 December 2004 (Council Decision 2004/862/EC).  
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1.  Price liberalisation 
Most price categories are liberalised except for some public services and utilities. Energy prices are being gradually adjusted 
towards cost recovery levels in both Republics. In 2004, further adjustments in electricity prices took place to bring them 
close to cost recovery levels, contributing to a resumption of inflation.  
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Further regional trade liberalisation is ensured by the ratification of a number of free trade agreements that SCG concluded 
with the neighbouring countries under the Stability Pact initiative. Substantial, but incomplete harmonisation of tariff rates of 
Serbia and Montenegro took place during 2003, with an attempt to create an internal market between the two republics. 
However, no agreement on the harmonisation of agricultural tariffs, alignment of import levies and a vast of non-tariff 
barriers has been reached. Consequently, two separate applications for WTO membership have been submitted. 
3.  Exchange regime 
Managed floating system in Serbia under which the nominal exchange rate was kept rather stable in 2001 and 2002 leading to 
a substantial real appreciation of around 50% during that period, though from a supposedly undervalued level at end-2000. In 
2004,  the  nominal  effective  exchange  rate  depreciated  by  15%  and  in  real  terms  by  3-4%.  Following  the  unilateral 
introduction of the German mark in Montenegro in 1999, the euro is now the sole legal tender in the republic. Higher 
inflation in Montenegro compared to the euro-area implies a substantial real appreciation. 
4.  Foreign Direct Investment 
Appropriate  legislation  as  well  as  a  foreign  investment  promotion  agency  is  in  place.  FDI  is  largely  related  to  large 
privatisation deals; greenfield and equity investments remain low. In 2004, FDI is expected to have declined to 4% of GDP. 
FDI inflows to Montenegro amounted to about € 50 million, consisting mainly of investment in the tourism sector. 
5.  Monetary policy 
In Serbia, continuation of stability-oriented monetary policy in 2004; balancing the objective of price stability with the goal 
of preserving external competitiveness. Annual inflation accelerated in Serbia to 13.7% in 2004, from 7.6% in 2003, driven 
by buoyant domestic demand, increases in administered prices and the rising cost of fuel imports. In Montenegro, given the 
adoption of the euro as sole legal tender the scope for an independent monetary policy is very limited and annual inflation 
reached 3.4% in 2004. 
6.  Public Finance 
Further progress with reforms aimed at improving expenditure control in both republics, but continued need for further fiscal 
consolidation  and  prioritisation  of  public  spending.  VAT  was  introduced  in  Montenegro  in  April;  its  introduction  was 
postponed to January 2005 in Serbia. Major reform step in Serbia was the transfer of all direct spending units to the single 
Treasury account and the steps to establish a centralised payroll system under the Treasury. 
7.  Privatisation and Enterprise Restructuring 
Privatisation efforts slowed in the first part of 2004, but recovered in the remainder of the year. However, the restructuring of 
large socially owned enterprises and public utilities has not started yet. In Montenegro, the privatisation of parts of the giant 
Aluminium factory and of the telecommunication company is well advanced. 
8.  Financial Sector Reform 
Banking supervision has been strengthened in both republics. The process of bank restructuring and privatisation in Serbia 
has  been  accelerated  in  the  second  half  of  2004  and  three  state-owned  banks  have  been  offered  for  tender  sale.  In 
Montenegro, the privatisation of the last state-owned bank Podgorica Banka is under preparation.   
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9.  TAJIKISTAN 
9.1.  Executive summary 
Tajikistan’s economy has continued to grow strongly last year, despite dampening 
effects from the landslides and floods in July. Strong output growth was recorded in 
the  industrial  and  in  the agricultural  sector,  leading  to  a  real  GDP  growth  of  an 
estimated 10.5% for 2004.  
Mixed results are noted in the area of structural reforms. A new, simplified Tax and 
Customs Code has been adopted last November, which should enable a rise in tax 
collection.  A  new  privatisation  strategy  for  2003-07  was  approved  in  November 
2003,  stipulating  that  state-owned  enterprises  -  with  a  few  exceptions  -  will  be 
privatised, restructured or liquidated. The restructuring and privatisation of farms is 
progressing,  despite  a  number  of  remaining  barriers.  A  Code  of  Ethics  for  civil 
servants was adopted by Presidential Decree on 14
th June 2004, as part of a broader 
civil service reform. 
The  fourth  (2003)  grant  instalment  of  the  Exceptional  Financial  Assistance  to 
Tajikistan - EUR 7 million – is expected to be disbursed as soon as the country has 
completed  the  early  debt  repayment  of  EUR  8  million.  This  would  bring  the 
outstanding  debt  of  Tajikistan  towards  the  EC  to  EUR  36  million  and  the  grant 
disbursements  would  total  EUR  28  million.  The  fifth  (2004)  instalment  will  be 
released  depending  on  the  findings  of  a  review  mission  planned  for  the  second 
quarter of 2005and following another early debt repayment of EUR 8 million. 
9.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Tajikistan’s economy has continued to grow strongly last year, despite dampening 
effects from the landslides and floods in July. In the first eleven months of 2004, 
output in the industrial sector rose by 16% year on year and the agricultural sector 
posted year-on-year growth of 15,4%, boosted by an increase in the cotton harvest. 
Real GDP growth for 2004 as a whole is likely to reach a post-independence record 
at about 10.5%.  
The government has been targeting a broadly feasible budget deficit of 0.5% of GDP 
for the full year, which incorporates a rise in spending in areas such as health and 
education. As for the 2005 budget, the government has claimed that 46% of total 
expenditure will be directed to the social sphere, in line with its commitment under 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). 
Floods  in  July  affected  the  availability  of  food  products  and  caused  inflationary 
pressure. However, this was offset by the combination of a more favourable grain 
harvest and tighter monetary policy. Annual average inflation is estimated at 7.5%, 
compared to more than 16% in 2003. 
At end-2003, total external debt amounted to USD 1 billion (73% of GDP), of which 
30% was owed to the largest creditor Russia. In October 2004, a bilateral agreement 
was signed, writing off USD 242 million out of Tajikistan’s bilateral debt towards 
Russia.  Tajikistan  would  settle  the  remainder  of  the  debt  by  31  December  2008  
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through  a  debt-to-equity  swap  (by  giving  Russia  a  share  in  a  major  hydropower 
plant). This agreement implies that the Tajik external debt is expected to fall to USD 
700 million or about 50% of GDP. 
Aluminium and cotton continue to dominate exports, but revenue from electricity 
(hydropower) sales should increase in the coming years. Global prices for aluminium 
have reached record highs in 2004, boosted in particular by strong demand in China. 
Global cotton prices have been on a downward trend throughout 2004, but remain 
strong compared with previous years. However, high export revenues and significant 
migrants’  remittances  were  more  than  offset  by  import  increases  associated  with 
rapid growth. As a consequence, the current account deficit widened from 1.3% in 
2003  to  an  estimated  1.9%  in  2004.  Import  coverage  of  gross  official  reserves 
increased from 1.8 months in 2003 to 2.3 months by end-2004. 
9.3.  Structural reforms 
On  the  revenue  side,  a  modernisation  office  has  been  established  charged  with 
overseeing reforms to the tax and customs system. Tax revenue is supposed to be 
boosted by the new, simplified Tax and Customs Code adopted on 3 November 2004 
by the Parliament. A two-tier income tax with a rate of 8% (previously 10%) for 
those who earn less than somoni 100/month (USD 33/month) and a 13% rate for 
those earning above this level has been introduced. Further, it foresees a single land 
tax for farmers, replacing the five different taxes applied before. The new Tax Code 
also contains tax provisions for foreign investors, exempting them from all taxes for 
up to five years, depending on the size of their investment. Weak enforcement of the 
new legislation is likely to remain a problem. 
A new privatisation strategy for 2003-07 was approved in November 2003. State-
owned enterprises, with a few exceptions, will be privatised, restructured (if direct 
privatisation  is  not  feasible)  or  liquidated.  Three  groups  of  enterprises  are 
distinguished. The small enterprises of the first group (422 in total) will be privatised 
through auctions; those in the second group (104 medium-sized companies) will be 
sold through competitive tender; the third group of 37 large and strategic enterprises 
will  be  dealt  with  individually,  with  specific  privatisation  and  restructuring 
programmes to be developed for each. This group includes the aluminium smelter 
Tadaz, the electric power telecom and railways monopolies, the airline and the state 
television companies. A total of 71 enterprises have already been privatised in the 
first  half  of  2004.  However,  many  could  only  be  sold  after  several  auctions  and 
below the original minimum prices. Ninety percent of the assets went to domestic 
investors. 
In September 2004, the State Land Committee completed the inspection of the land 
reform process in 59 cities and districts of the country. Altogether, by 1
st of June 
2004,  21.281  Dehkan  farms  (private  farms)  have  been  created  on  the  basis  of 
restructured farms. In general, progress in farm privatisation has been hindered by 
the indebtedness of state-owned farms. According to the government, state farms 
have accumulated USD 255 million in debt, of which 66% is owed to private foreign 
creditors. The private debt burden alone is equivalent to 130% of cotton exports. In 
January 2004, the government agreed to write off USD 80 million in state debt, but 
the issue of the private debt is unresolved. One option under consideration is to swap 
the existing external debt for temporary cotton marketing rights.  
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A Code of Ethics for civil servants was adopted by Presidential Decree on 14
th June 
2004. The Code applies to all levels of civil service (from Ministers to local civil 
servants) and requires them to perform in a professional, fair and independent way. 
The adoption of this text is supposed to be part of a broader civil service reform. 
Within  the  National  Bank  of  Tajikistan  (NBT),  extensive  reforms  were  already 
undertaken, following recommendations by the IMF. Staff was reduced by 20% and 
at the same time wages have increased considerably. Training programs were set up 
in  order  to  improve  competences  of  the  officials.  President  Rahmonov  signed  a 
Decree on 4 November 2004 raising the minimum wage and salaries of government 
employees as of 1 January 2005. Salaries of civil servants in science, health care and 
social  sectors  would  raise  by  100%,  while  salaries  of  teachers in  preschools  and 
elementary  schools  would  increase  by  70%.  The  minimum  wage  unit  will  also 
increase from 7 somoni (2.5 USD) to 12 somoni (4.3 USD) in 2005. 
9.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Tajikistan has benefited from an assistance package which consists of a loan of EUR 
60 million (disbursed in March 2001) and a total grant amount of up to EUR 35 
million to be disbursed in successive annual instalments. 
As  Tajikistan  has  made  satisfactory  progress  in  macroeconomic  policies  and  in 
structural reform, it has benefited from maximum annual grant tranches, EUR 21 
million so far. On the other hand, the EC has not pushed for the maximum annual 
debt  repayments  which  the  MoU  would  have  allowed.  Both  in  2001  and  2002, 
Tajikistan was asked to repay EUR 8 million only, whereas the MoU would have 
allowed requesting EUR 12 million. Tajikistan’s outstanding debt to the EC is now 
EUR 44 million. A fourth grant instalment of EUR 7 million is to be disbursed in 
April 2005 after Tajikistan has made a third early debt repayment of EUR 8 million. 
Prior to it, the Commission performed an operational assessment with the assistance 
of an external consultant in June 2004. The assessment concluded that, despite some 
weaknesses detected, a framework for sound financial management is effective. A 
further mission to Dushanbe is foreseen in the second quarter of 2005, to review the 
conditionality linked to the fifth (final) grant instalment.   
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1.  Price liberalisation 
Most prices are liberalised (with the exception of public utilities). 
2.  Trade liberalisation  
Relatively liberal trade system with persistent non-tariff barriers. Import tariffs were unified 
at 5% in May 2002. Tajikistan has applied for membership in the WTO (observer status since 
2001). The Eurasian Economic Community (including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan) aims at promoting regional economic co-operation. 
3.  Exchange regime  
Relatively liberal exchange regime. The official exchange rate was unified with the curb 
market rate in July 2000 when an interbank foreign exchange market began operating. The 
new currency, somoni, was introduced in October 2000. A managed floating regime of the 
somoni is in place. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  
Modest  foreign  direct  investment  due  to  Tajikistan’s  small  market,  lack  of  regional 
integration,  slow  pace  of  privatisation,  limited  access  to  financing,  weakness  of  public 
administration and corruption. FDI inflows were 3.0% of GDP in 2002 and around 2% in 
2003 and 2004. 
5.  Monetary policy 
A Monetary Policy Committee was set up in 2003, which should lead to a more effective 
monetary policy. A decree was issued the same year, withdrawing lending authority from all 
National Bank branch managers, department heads and deputy chairpersons. It should stop 
the practice of direct credits from the NBT to the cotton sector. 
6.  Public finances  
Total tax collection of the general government increased from 15.5% in 2003 to an estimated 
16.2% of GDP in 2004. This increase is mainly due to improved administration of the VAT, 
including completion of the transition to the destination principle. 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring  
A  new  privatisation  strategy  for  2003-07  was  approved  in  November  2003.  State-owned 
enterprises, with a few exceptions, will be privatised, restructured (if direct privatisation is 
not feasible) or liquidated. 
8.  Financial sector reform  
A reduction in transfer fees was decided and progress has been made in improving banking 
regulation  and  supervision.  This  has  encouraged  more  Tajik  workers  to  use  the  banking 
system to remit wages earned abroad.  
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10.  UKRAINE 
10.1.  Executive summary 
Economic growth accelerated to 12% in 2004 fuelled by strong external demand and 
high  market  prices  for  Ukraine’s  main  exports,  notably  steel.  The  balance  of 
payments strengthened as current account surplus reached 11% of GDP. Inflationary 
pressures were exacerbated by loose fiscal policies in the second half of the year in 
the  run-up  to  the  presidential  elections.  The  new  Government  nominated  after 
president  Yuschchenko’s  victory  will  have  to  address  these  emerging 
macroeconomic imbalances in early 2005. 
The  new  Government  is  also  expected  to  tackle  corruption  and  the  backlog  of 
structural reforms, including increasing transparency of privatisation procedures and 
improving tax and customs administration in order to improve the business climate. 
The new Government’s programme already includes encouraging elements in several 
key areas. 
The IMF approved in March 2004 a precautionary stand-by arrangement (SBA) for 
Ukraine. Ukraine did not request any disbursements, however, and the arrangement 
fell off track in the autumn due to slippages in fiscal policy. EC’s macro-financial 
assistance to Ukraine could however be made available in case Ukraine’s external 
financial situation deteriorates so that it decides to request access to IMF resources. 
10.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Ukraine’s GDP reached the equivalent of about EUR 50 billion in 2004 which is still 
only slightly more than half of the GDP level before transition. Economic growth 
reached a record high rate of 12% in 2004 (real GDP growth was 9.4% in 2003). 
Growth continued to be driven by both strong external demand for Ukraine’s main 
exports  (steel,  machinery,  chemicals)  and  robust  domestic  consumption  and 
investment.  Industrial output grew by 12.5% as a whole but a declining trend in 
monthly growth rates had been visible already after spring. After a poor harvest in 
2003,  agricultural  output  recovered  to  its  normal  level  (+19%  in  real  terms  in 
comparison  to  2003).  Construction  also  picked  up  strongly  (+22%).  Retail  and 
wholesale trade also grew by nearly 20% in real terms. 
While Ukraine’s exports benefited from continued strong demand in its traditional 
export markets in EU 25 and Russia, Ukraine also began to trade more with the rest 
of  the  world,  including  with  China.  Exporters’  profits  then  further  fuelled  an 
investment and construction boom. At the same time, domestic consumption demand 
was supported by several factors. The progressive income tax (on a scale of 10-40%) 
was replaced by a flat rate of 13% in the beginning of 2004. In the run-up to the 
presidential  election,  the  government  also  increased  pensions  and  other  social 
transfers.  These  increases  in  benefits  had  not  been  budgeted  for  2004  but  the 
government managed to finance them out of privatisation proceeds which exceeded 
amounts originally projected in the budget. 
As  a  result  of  previous  Government’s  spending  decisions  before  the  presidential 
elections,  inflationary  pressures  and  fiscal  imbalances  emerged,  which  the  new  
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Government has to address as a matter of priority in 2005. Consumer price inflation 
reached 12.3% in 2004 (8.2% in 2003). Inflation accelerated towards the end of the 
year so that the last quarter of the year saw a 6.2% increase in the index (+2.4% in 
December alone). Price regulations on meat and gasoline were put in place in 2004 
but these are unlikely to persist. The producer price index increased by 24% in 2004 
and the wide gap vis-à-vis the consumer price index maintains an upward pressure 
for the latter in 2005.  
In  order  to  contain  inflationary  expectations,  the  most  important  challenge  is  to 
reduce the fiscal deficit, which has been on an increasing trend since about mid-
2004.  The  deficit  for  the  consolidated  government  (incl.  central  government  and 
local budgets) is estimated at up to 4.5% of GDP for 2004, whereas a deficit of 
below 2% had been projected in early 2004. The approved budget for 2005 does not 
fully reflect all spending decisions taken during the election campaign (concerning in 
particular finances of the extra-budgetary pension fund). Accordingly the projected 
deficit of 2.2% of GDP will be exceeded substantially unless the new Government 
takes corrective measures in early 2005.  
Households’  bank  deposits  declined  in  October-December  2004  when  people 
converted  their  hryvnia  balances  to  cash  dollars.  The  National  Bank  of  Ukraine 
(NBU) was able to manage the imminent liquidity crisis by drawing massively on its 
foreign exchange reserves. Restrictions on deposit withdrawals and foreign exchange 
transactions were put in place but these were lifted at the end of the year when the 
situation had stabilised.  
Large current account surpluses (estimated to have reached 10-11% of GDP in 2004) 
and NBU’s policy of de facto pegging the hryvnia/ USD exchange rate (at about 
UAH 5.33) led to sharp increases in international reserves during the first half of 
2004. Meanwhile, the hryvnia depreciated against the euro from UAH 6.7 to UAH 
7.2 during the year. Despite the political turmoil, the gross international reserves of 
the NBU (USD 9.5 billion at the end of December 2004) are still above their level 
one year before, covering comfortably more than three months of imports. In early 
2005 the international reserves have began to increase again.  
In the past, the NBU did not actively sterilise the built up of international reserves. 
Rising  demand  for  the  hryvnia  (re-monetisation)  and  increases  in  government 
deposits did help to a large extent to match the additional supply of liquidity through 
the NBU. Faced with emerging inflationary pressures in the second half of 2004, the 
NBU adopted a more active sterilisation policy (e.g. through reverse repos and the 
issuance of certificates of deposits). A more flexible exchange rate policy would, 
however, be helpful for better inflation control and in managing risks of unchecked 
credit expansion. The real exchange rate is substantially undervalued according to 
estimates by the IMF but the NBU has wanted to avoid any drastic policy changes. 
Nevertheless, the NBU announced its readiness to consider switching to inflation 
targeting as a long term goal.  
10.3.  Structural reforms 
Decisive action by the new Government to improve the business climate will no 
doubt  have  a  significant impact  on  future  economic  growth  also  through  foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Strengthening of corporate governance and dismantling of  
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uncompetitive  practices  would  mobilise  more  broadly  based  economic  growth, 
involving also small and medium sized enterprises. New Civil Code and Commercial 
Code became effective in January 2004 clarifying basic property rights but some 
inconsistencies  still  remain  in  the  legislation.  Adoption  of  a  new  Joint  Stock 
Company Law is still pending. Lack of transparency in dealing with the persistent 
problem of the arrears on VAT refunds to exporters is one example which inhibits 
improvements in the business climate.  
In May 2004, the European Commission concluded that Ukraine did not yet meet the 
criteria for a market economy status in the context of anti-dumping investigations 
due to recent state interference in pricing in some industrial sectors and remaining 
shortcomings  in  the  bankruptcy  legislation.  Ukraine  has  made  progress  with  its 
accession to the WTO by signing bilateral protocols on market access with 25 WTO 
members (including the EU but not yet the United States). Ukraine is now aiming at 
joining the WTO by the end of 2005.  
Revenues  from  privatisation  reached  in  2004  the  highest  annual  amount  during 
Ukraine’s independence, UAH 9.58 billion, equivalent to about EUR 1.45 billion. 
The main assets privatised were the Kryvorizhstal steel plant, the Pavlohradvuhillia 
coal  mine  and  Azot  (Severodonetsk)  chemical  company.  Foreign  investors  were 
effectively  excluded  from  the  most  attractive  privatisations under  non-transparent 
tender  procedures.  At  least  some  of  the  most  controversial  asset  sales  will  be 
reviewed by the new Government, and even renationalising cannot be excluded in 
some cases.  
While the new Government addresses the imminent fiscal imbalances, further efforts 
should  also  be  devoted  to  an  overall  strengthening  of  the  public  finances  and  to 
improvements  in  the  accountability  of  budget  entities.  For  instance  the  proposed 
amendments to the constitution concerning the Accounting Chamber (the supreme 
external audit body) would strengthen its functions considerably. Rationalisation of 
subsidies (whether direct or indirect) would be desirable. Better management of state 
enterprises  would  also  benefit  the  budget.  At  the  same  time,  a  comprehensive 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework should be developed to provide a valuable 
tool for prioritisation of public expenditures in future budgets. 
The  sudden  deposit  withdrawals  during  the  last  quarter  of  2004  were  merely  a 
temporary  setback  after  a  period  of  very  rapid  growth.  Business  and  household 
deposits grew by 42% and 29% respectively for the year as a whole. Banks increased 
their lending volumes also by  about 30%. Credit quality is a concern in light of 
lending to related parties and weaknesses in banks’ risk assessment practises, which 
are exacerbated by weak accounting and reporting standards in the corporate sector. 
Ukraine’s credit-to-GDP ratio is still relatively low at around 30%. Although the on-
going credit boom in Ukraine can be attributed to catching up from a low level of 
financial intermediation, the risks are significantly increased given that institutional 
and structural reforms in the financial sector have lagged behind during the strong 
economic recovery.  
10.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
The  ECOFIN  Council  adopted  in  July  2002  a  decision  granting  a  new  loan  to 
Ukraine  under  the  EC’s  macro-financial  assistance  in  the  amount  of  EUR  110  
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million while cancelling the non-disbursed part (EUR 92 million) of the 1998 loan 
facility. However, in view of the strong improvement of its balance of payments in 
2002-2004, Ukraine did not have any residual financing needs, and therefore the new 
loan has not been disbursed by the EC. This improvement in the external situation 
was  also  reflected  in  Ukraine’s  decision  to  treat  the  IMF  stand-by  arrangement 
(SBA)  as  precautionary,  and  Ukraine  has  not  drawn  any  funds  under  this 
arrangement, approved by the IMF Board in March 2004. The SBA arrangement 
expires at the end of March 2005. 
The  Commission  adopted  a  similar  precautionary  approach  vis-à-vis  the  macro-
financial assistance to Ukraine. The EC loan would be kept on hold in case a balance 
of payments financing need emerges later and Ukraine decides to use IMF resources. 
The July 2002 Council decision providing the legal framework for this operation will 
remain in force and the Commission stands ready to reactivate this assistance should 
the need arise in the future. Ukraine’s outstanding debt to the Community decreased 
by EUR 57 million in 2004 to a total of EUR175 million.  
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SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1.  Price liberalisation 
Most prices have been liberalised. In 2004 meat and gasoline prices were administratively 
regulated. Communal service tariffs (such as gas, electricity, heating and rents) are subject 
administrative controls and tend to be below full-cost recovery levels. 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Import regimes free of quantitative restrictions wit a few exceptions for health and safety 
reasons.  A  relatively  liberal  Customs  Code  (2001).  The  trade-weighted  effective  average 
import tariff is about 7 %. A high degree of dispersion in tariffs remains between 0 and 70%. 
A few export restrictions remain, namely on sunflower seeds, live animals, cow hides and 
skins,  and  scrap  metals.  Agricultural  quotas  are  one  of  the  main  outstanding  issues  in 
Ukraine’s WTO accession negotiations.  
3.  Foreign exchange regime 
The exchange rate regime is classified as a conventional pegged arrangement as the National 
Bank of Ukraine maintained a de facto peg vis-à-vis the USD at about 5.3 hryvnia. Full 
current account convertibility (Article VIII status at the IMF) since September 1996. There 
are restrictions on all capital account transactions, mainly taking the form of licensing and 
registering requirements.  
4.  Foreign direct investment 
FDI inflows increased as a percentage of GDP from 2% (2002) to 3% (2003) but remained 
below the average for the CIS (5.3%).  
5.  Monetary policy 
The  National  Bank  of  Ukraine  relies  mainly  on  indirect  monetary  instruments.  Credit  to 
commercial  banks  allocated  mostly  through  the  Lombard  facility,  credit  auctions  and 
repossessions.  
6.  Public finances 
Consolidated government expenditure estimated at about 39% of GDP; revenues 36% of 
GDP of which tax revenues 31% (2004).  
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
The private sector accounts for 65% of GDP. Privatisation of large enterprises accelerated in 
2004  albeit  under  controversial  and  non-transparent  terms,  including  notably  Ukraine’s 
largest steel plant Kryvorizhstal (deal expected to be reviewed by the new Government in 
2005). 
8.  Financial sector reform 
Over 150 operating banks of which several weakly capitalised. State-owned banks account 
for about 10% of bank assets.   
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Annex 1A - COMMUNITY MACRO-FINANCIAL AND EXCEPTIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
 TO THIRD COUNTRIES BY DATES OF COUNCIL DECISIONS
Status of effective disbursements as of end-December 2004 (in millions of euro) 
Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements
Hungary I 22.02.90 90/83/EC 870 Apr. 1990 350 610 260
(Structural adjustment loan) Feb. 1991 260 ( Suspended)
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 25.02.91 91/106/EC 375 Mar. 1991 185 375
(BOP loan) Mar. 1992 190
Hungary II 24.06.91 91/310/EC 180 Aug. 1991 100 180
(BOP loan) Jan. 1993 80
Bulgaria I  24.06.91 91/311/EC 290 Aug. 1991 150 290
(BOP loan) Mar. 1992 140
Romania I 22.07.91 91/384/EC 375 Jan. 1992 190 375
(BOP loan) Apr. 1992 185
Israel   (1) 22.07.91 91/408/EC 187,5 Mar. 1992 187,5 187,5
(Structural adjustment soft loan)
Algeria I 23.09.91 91/510/EC 400 Jan. 1992 250 400
(BOP loan) Aug. 1994 150
Albania I 28.09.92 92/482/EC 70 Dec. 1992 35 70
(BOP grant) Aug. 1993 35
Bulgaria II 19.10.92 92/511/EC 110 Dec. 1994 70 110
(BOP loan) Aug .1996 40
Baltics 23.11.92 92/542/EC 220 135 85
(BOP loans) (Suspended)
of which :
    Estonia (40) Mar. 1993 20 (20) (20)
    Latvia (80) Mar. 1993 40 (40) (40)
    Lithuania (100) Jul. 1993 50 (75) (25)
Aug. 1995 25
Romania II 27.11.92 92/551/EC 80 Feb. 1993 80 80
(BOP loan)
Moldova I 13.06.94 94/346/EC 45 Dec. 1994 25 45
(BOP loan) Aug. 1995 20
Romania III 20.06.94 94/369/EC 125 Nov. 1995 55 125
(BOP loan) Sep. 1997 40
Dec. 1997 30
Albania II 28.11.94 94/773/EC 35 Jun. 1995 15 35
(BOP grant) Oct. 1996 20
Algeria II 22.12.94 94/938/EC 200 Nov. 1995 100 100 100
(BOP loan) (Suspended)
Slovakia 22.12.94 94/939/EC 130 Jul. 1996 130   
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Ukraine II 23.10.95 95/442/EC 200 Aug. 1996 50 200
(BOP loan) Oct. 1996 50
Sep. 1997 100
Moldova II 25.03.96 96/242/EC 15 Dec. 1996 15 15
(BOP loan)
fYRoM I 22.07.97 97/471/EC 40 Sep. 1997 25 40
(BOP loan) Feb. 1998 15
Bulgaria III 22.07.97 97/472/EC 250 Feb. 1998 125 250
(BOP loan) Dec. 1998 125
Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan (2) 17.11.97 97/787/EC 375 279 96
(Structural adjustment loans and grants)
of which 28.3.00 00/244/EC
   Armenia (58) Dec. 1998 (loan) 28 56,5 1,5
Dec. 1998 (grant) 8
Dec.  1999 (grant) 4
Feb. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Dec. 2002 (grant) 5,5
June 2004 (grant) 5,5
   Georgia (175) Jul. 1998 (loan) 110 141,5 33,5
Aug. 1998 (grant) 10
Sep. 1999 (grant) 9
Dec. 2001 (grant) 6
Dec 2004 (grant) 6,5
   Tajikistan (95) Mar. 2001 (loan) 60 81 14
Mar. 2001 (grant) 7
Dec. 2001 (grant) 7
Feb. 2003 (grant) 7
modified by
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Ukraine III 15.10.98 98/592/EC 150 Jul. 1999 58 58 92
(BoP loan) 12.07.02 02/639/EC (Cancelled)
Albania III 22.04.99 99/282/EC 20 20
(BOP loan)
Bosnia I  (3) 10.05.99 99/325/EC 60 Dec. 1999 (grant) 15 60
(BOP loan and grant) Dec. 1999 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/899/EC Dec. 2000 (grant) 10
Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
Dec. 2001 (grant) 15
Bulgaria IV 08.11.99 99/731/EC 100 Dec. 1999 40 100
(BOP loan) Sep. 2000 60
fYRoM II (4) 08.11.99 99/733/EC 80 Dec. 2000 (grant) 20 98
(BOP loan and grant) 18 Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/900/EC Dec. 2001 (loan) 12
Dec. 2001 (grant) 10
May 2003 (grant) 10
June 2003 (loan) 10
Dec. 2003 (loan) 18
Dec. 2003 (grant) 8
Romania  IV 08.11.99 99/732/EC 200 Jun. 2000 100 150 50
(BOP loan) July 2003 (loan) 50
Kosovo I (5) 19.02.00 00/140/EC 35 Mar. 2000 20 35
(Grant budgetary support) Aug. 2000 15
Montenegro (5) 22.05.00 00/355/EC 20 Aug. 2000 7 20
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2000 13
Moldova III 10.07.00 00/452/EC 15 15
(BOP loan) 19.12.02 02/1006/EC (Cancelled)
Kosovo II (3) 27.06.01 01/511/EC 30 Sep. 2001 15 30
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2002 15
Serbia and Montenegro (ex FRY) I (6) 16.07.01 01/549/EC 345 Oct. 2001 225 345
(BOP loan and grant) Oct. 2001 35
10.12.01 01/901/EC Jan. 2002 40
Aug. 2002 45
Ukraine IV 12.07.02 02/639/EC 110 110
(BOP loan)
Serbia and Montenegro II (ex FRY) (7) 05.11.02 02/882/EC 130 (7) Dec. 2002 (grant) 30 105 25
Fev. 2003 (loan) 10
Aug. 2003 (grant) 35
Aug. 2003 (loan) 30
25.11.03 03/825/EC 70 Dec 2004 (grant) 10 10 60
07.12.2004 04/862/EC
Bosnia II (8) 05.11.02 02/883/EC 60 Fev. 2003 (grant) 15 35 25
Dec. 2003 (grant) 10
7/12/2004 04/861/EC







Moldova IV 19.12.02 02/1006/EC 15 15
Albania IV 29.04.04 04/580/EC 25 25
                                                             ------- ------- -------





(4) Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 50 million and grants of up to € 48 million.
(5) Exceptional financial assistance.
(6) Includes a loan principal amount of € 225 million and grants of € 120 million.
(7) Includes a loan principal amount of € 55 million and grants of € 75 million
(8) Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million
(9) Gross amount
Exceptional financial assistance, which includes a ceiling of euro 245 million for the loans and a ceiling of euro 130 million for the grants
Assistance to Israel includes a loan principal amount of € 160 million and grants of € 27.5 million in the form of interest subsidies.
Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 20 million and grants of up to € 40 million.
Out of the global amount of euro 375 million, maximum amounts of euro 58 million, euro 175 million and euro 95 million were actually agreed with the beneficiary
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Status of effective disbursements as of end-December 2004 (in millions of euro) 
Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements
A. EU Accession countries
Baltics 23.11.92 92/542/EC 220 135 85
(BOP loans) (Suspended)
of which :
    Estonia (40) Mar. 1993 20 (20) (20)
    Latvia (80) Mar. 1993 40 (40) (40)
    Lithuania (100) Jul. 1993 50 (75) (25)
Aug. 1995 25
Bulgaria I  24.06.91 91/311/EC 290 Aug. 1991 150 290
(BOP loan) Mar. 1992 140
Bulgaria II 19.10.92 92/511/EC 110 Dec. 1994 70 110
(BOP loan) Aug .1996 40
Bulgaria III 22.07.97 97/472/EC 250 Feb. 1998 125 250
(BOP loan) Dec. 1998 125
Bulgaria IV 08.11.99 99/731/EC 100 Dec. 1999 40 100
(BOP loan) Sep. 2000 60
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 25.02.91 91/106/EC 375 Mar. 1991 185 375
(BOP loan) Mar. 1992 190
Hungary I 22.02.90 90/83/EC 870 Apr. 1990 350 610 260
(Structural adjustment loan) Feb. 1991 260 ( Suspended)
Hungary II 24.06.91 91/310/EC 180 Aug. 1991 100 180
(BOP loan) Jan. 1993 80
Romania I 22.07.91 91/384/EC 375 Jan. 1992 190 375
(BOP loan) Apr. 1992 185
Romania II 27.11.92 92/551/EC 80 Feb. 1993 80 80
(BOP loan)
Romania III 20.06.94 94/369/EC 125 Nov. 1995 55 125
(BOP loan) Sep. 1997 40
Dec. 1997 30
Romania  IV 08.11.99 99/732/EC 200 Jun. 2000 100 150 50
(BOP loan) July 2003 50
Slovakia 22.12.94 94/939/EC 130 Cancelled 130
(BOP loan) (Jul. 1996) Cancelled
------- ------- -------
TOTAL A 3305 2780 525
 TO THIRD COUNTRIES BY REGION
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B. Western Balkans
Albania I 28.09.92 92/482/EC 70 Dec. 1992 35 70
(BOP grant) Aug. 1993 35
Albania II 28.11.94 94/773/EC 35 Jun. 1995 15 35
(BOP grant) Oct. 1996 20
Albania III 22.04.99 99/282/EC 20 20
(BOP loan) ( Cancelled)
Bosnia I  (1) 10.05.99 99/325/EC 60 Dec. 1999 (grant) 15 60
(BOP loan and grant) Dec. 1999 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/899/EC Dec. 2000 (grant) 10
Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
Dec. 2001 (grant) 15
fYRoM I 22.07.97 97/471/EC 40 Sep. 1997 25 40
(BOP loan) Feb. 1998 15
fYRoM II (2) 08.11.99 99/733/EC 80 Dec. 2000 (grant) 20 98
(BOP loan and grant) Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
10.12.2001 01/900/EC 18 Dec. 2001 (loan) 12
Dec. 2001 (grant) 10
May 2003 (grant) 10
June 2003 (loan) 10
Dec. 2003 (loan) 18
Dec.) 2003 (grant) 8
Kosovo I (3) 19.02.00 00/140/EC 35 Mar. 2000 20 35
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Kosovo II (3) 27.06.01 01/511/EC 30 Sep. 2001 15 30
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2002 15
Montenegro (3) 22.05.00 00/355/EC 20 Aug. 2000 7 20
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2000 13
16.07.01 01/549/EC 345 Oct. 2001 (grant) 35 345
modified by Oct. 2001 (loan) 225
10.12.2001 01/901/EC Jan. 2002 (grant) 40
Aug.2002 (grant) 45
05.11.02 02/882/EC 130 Dec. 2002 (grant) 30 105 25
Fev. 2003 (loan) 10
Aug. 2003 (grant) 35
Aug. 2003 (loan) 30
25.11.03 03/825/EC (7) 70 Dec 2004 (grant) 10 10 60
07.12.04 04/862/EC
05.11.02 02/883/EC 60 Fev. 2003 (grant) 15 35 25
Dec. 2003 (grant) 10
Dec 2004 (loan) 10
07.12.04 04/861/EC
29.04.04 04/580/EC 25 25
TOTAL B 1038 883 155
------- ------- -------
(1)  Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million.
(2)  Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 50 million and grants of up to € 48 million.
(3) Exceptional financial assistance.
(4)  Includes a loan principal amount of € 225 million and grants of € 120 million.
(5) Includes a loan principal amount of € 55 million and grants of € 75 million
(6) Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million
(7) Includes a loan principal amount of € 25 million and grants of € 45 million
C. New Independent States (NIS)
Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan (8) 17.11.97 97/787/EC 375 279 96
(Structural adjustment loans and grants) modified by
of which 28.3.00 00/244/EC
   Armenia (58) Dec. 1998 (loan) 28 (56,5) (1,5)
Dec. 1998 (grant) 8
Dec.  1999 (grant) 4
Feb. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Dec. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Jun 2004( grant) 5,5
   Georgia (175) Jul. 1998 (loan) 110 (141,5) (33,5)
Aug. 1998 (grant) 10
Sep. 1999 (grant) 9
Dec. 2001 (grant) 6
DEc. 2004 (grant) 6,5
Serbia and Montenegro I 
(ex FRY) (4)
Serbia and Montenegro II 
( ex FRY) (5)








   Tajikistan (95) Mar. 2001 (loan) 60 (74) (21)
Mar. 2001 (grant) 7
Dec. 2001 (grant) 7
Belarus 10.04.95 95/132/EC 55 Dec. 1995 30 30 25
(BOP loan) (Suspended)
Moldova I 13.06.94 94/346/EC 45 déc-94 25 45
(BOP loan) Aug. 1995 20
Moldova II 25.03.96 96/242/EC 15 Dec. 1996 15 15
(BOP loan)
Moldova III 10.07.00 00/452/EC 15 15
(BOP loan) 19.12.02 02/1006 EC (cancelled)
19.12.02 02/1006/EC 15 15
(15)
Ukraine I 22.12.94 94/940/EC 85 Dec. 1995 85 85
(BOP loan)
Ukraine II 23.10.95 95/442/EC 200 Aug. 1996 50 200
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Ukraine III 15.10.98 98/592/EC 150 Jul. 1999 58 58 92
(BoP loan) 12.07.02 02/639/EC (cancelled)
12.07.02 02/639/EC 110 110
(15)
------- ------- -------
TOTAL C 1065 (9) 712 353
D. Mediterranean countries
Israel   (9) 22.07.91 91/408/EC 187,5 Mar. 1992 187,5 187,5
(Structural adjustment soft loan)
Algeria I 23.09.91 91/510/EC 400 Jan. 1992 250 400
(BOP loan) Aug. 1994 150
Algeria II 22.12.94 94/938/EC 200 Nov. 1995 100 100 100
(BOP loan) (Suspended)
------- ------- -------
TOTAL D 787,5 687,5 100
TOTAL A+B+C+D 6195,5 5062,5 1133
(8)   Exceptional financial assistance, which includes a ceiling of euro 245 million for the loans and a ceiling of euro 130 million for the grants
        Out of the global amount of euro 375 million, maximum amounts of euro 58 million, euro 175 million and euro 95 million were actually agreed with the beneficiary countries.
beneficiary countries
(9)    Assistance to Israel includes a loan principal amount of ECU 160 million and grants of ECU 27,5 million in the form of interesr subsidies.
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2001 2002 2003 2004
Programme (1) Estimates
GDP at constant prices (Percent change)
Albania 7,2 3,4 6,0 6,2 6,0
Armenia 9,6 13,2 13,9 7,0 10,1
Bosnia-Herzegovina 4,5 5,5 3,5 5,1 5,0
Bulgaria 4,1 4,9 4,3 5,7
FYROM -4,5 0,9 3,2 2,2
Georgia 4,7 5,5 11,1 6,0 8,4
Kosovo 21,2 1,2 3,1 3,2
Moldova 6,1 7,8 6,3 7,3
Serbia & Montenegro 5,5 4,0 2,7 7,2 4,8
Romania 5,7 5,0 5,2 8,3
Tajikistan 10,2 9,1 10,3 6,0 10,5
Ukraine 9,2 5,2 9,4 6,0 12,0
Consumer price (end year) (Percent change)
Albania 3,1 5,2 2,4 6,4 3,0
Armenia 2,9 2,0 6,2 3,0 2,0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3,1 0,4 0,6 0,9
Bulgaria 7,4 5,8 2,3 6,2
FYROM 5,5 1,8 1,2 -0,4
Georgia 3,4 5,4 7,0 5,0 7,5
Kosovo 11,7 3,6 1,0 1,8
Moldova 6,4 4,4 15,7 12,5
Serbia & Montenegro 92,5 21,5 11,6 9,7 9,5
Romania 34,5 22,5 15,3 11,9
Tajikistan 12,5 14,5 13,7 7,0 8,5
Ukraine 6,1 -0,6 8,2 6,0 12,3
Fiscal balance (Percent of GDP)
Albania -7,6 -6,1 -4,1 -6,1 -4,8
Armenia  -3,8 -0,4 -1,1 -1,9 -1,5
Bosnia-Herzegovina -3,3 -2,2 -4,0 -0,1 -0,1
Bulgaria 0,2 -0,8 0,6 1,4
FYROM -7,2 -5,7 -1,6 1,4
Georgia  -2,0 -2,0 -2,5 -1,6 0,7
Kosovo 7,2 6,2 2,5 -7,0
Moldova -0,3 -0,9 0,2 -1,5
Serbia & Montenegro -0,7 -3,4 -4,0 -1,7 0,5
Romania -3,5 -2,0 -2,0 -1,4
Tajikistan -0,1 -0,1 0,9 -0,5 -0,4
Ukraine -1,5 0,2 0,1 -0,8 -4,5
Current account (Percent of GDP)
Albania -3,2 -6,5 -5,1 -5,8 -5,6
Armenia -9,5 -6,2 -6,8 -5,9 -5,0
Bosnia-Herzegovina -16,2 -20,0 -18,0 -15,8 -18,5
Bulgaria -7,3 -5,6 -8,6 -7,5
FYROM -6,5 -9,5 -3,3 -6,0
Georgia -6,4 -5,8 -7,2 -9,6 -7,5
Kosovo -8,6 -11,6 -15,8 -18,0
Moldova -2,5 -4,4 -6,8 -6,7
Serbia & Montenegro -4,6 -8,8 -10,2 -11,6 -11,0
Romania -5,0 -3,6 -6,1 -7,6
ANNEX 3: Selected economic indicators
 
Tajikistan -7,0 -2,7 -1,3 -2,9 -1,9
Ukraine 3,7 7,5 5,8 3,7 10,2   
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Official foreign exchange reserves (end year)
Albania 0,8 0,9 1,3 0,9 0,9
Armenia 3,6 3,7 4,0 3,7 3,7
Bosnia-Herzegovina 5,1 4,6 5,1 4,4
Bulgaria 3,6 4,6 5,5 7,0
FYROM 0,8 0,5 0,8 0,7
Georgia 1,4 1,7 1,3 1,3 1,6
Kosovo 0,3 0,3 0,5 0,3
Moldova 2,1 1,9 1,7 2,0
Serbia & Montenegro 1,3 2,4 4,5 3,5 3,7
Romania 4,4 6,5 7,1 11,7
Tajikistan 1,9 1,8 1,9 2,7 2,3
Ukraine 1,7 1,9 2,4 3,0 3,8
(1) Programme targets set in IMF programmes, if any.  
Sources: National authorities and IMF
(EUR in mln)
 